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Executive Summary 
In May 2006, CHZM HILL Hanford Group, Inc. chattered an Expert Review Panel (EM} 
to review the current status of the Demonstmhm Bulk Vitrification System @BVS). It 
is the consensus of the ERP that bulk vitrification is a technology that requires further 
dcvehpment and evaluation to determine its potential for meeting the Hanford waste 
stabilization mission. No fatal flaws (issues that would jeopardize the overall: DBVS 
mission that cannot be mitigated) were found, given the current state of the project. 
However, a number of technical issues were found that could significantly affect the 
project's ability to meet its overall mission as stated in the project Justification of Mission 
Need document, if not satisfactorily rcsolved. 
The ERP recognizes that the project has changed fmrn an accelerated schedule 
dernonstmtion project to a formally chartered project that must be in full compliance with 
DOE 4 13.3 requirements. The perspective of the ERP presented herein, is measured 
against the formally chartered project a5 stated in the approved Justification of Mission 
Need document, 
A Justification of Mission Need document was approved in July 2006 which dcfined the 
objectives for the DBVS Project. In this document, DOE concluded that bulk 
vitrification is a viable technology that q u i r e s  additional development to determine its 
potential applicability to treatment of a portion of the Hanford low activity wastc. The 
DSVS mission need statement now includes thc following primary objectives: 
Process approximately 190,000 gallons of Tank S-109 waste into fifty 100 metric 
ton boxes of vitrified product. 
Store and dispose of these boxes at Hanford's Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) 
Evaluate the waste form characteristics. 
Gather pitot plant operability data, a d  
DeveIop the overalI life cycle system pcrformance of bulk vitrification and ' 
produce a comparison of the bulk vitrification process to building a second LAW 
Jmobilization facility or othcr suppkmental treatment alternatives as provided 
in M62-08. 
While the DBVS is clearly poised to meet the first three objectives, 8 e  project must 
expeditiously develop plans to achieve the last two and develop clew success criteria to 
determine whether they have been met, 
A summary of the key issues that need technical and management actions follows. 
Additional cold testing is needed to underpin proms design and operations leg., 
flow of dried waste feed, prevention of secondary phases, and balancing of the 
ofT-gas systems) before radioactive feed is introduced. 
iii 
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The mixerdryer and ofl-gas systems need special attention in the next project 
phase, as most of the dcvelopmcnt work to date has been focused on the In 
Container Vitrificationm process. 
System complexity should be reduced to enhance system operability and 
avai lab i 1 i ty . 
Process sampling and monitoring plans should bc improved to assure that 
essential operational and needed R&D data from DBVS test rum are captured. 
A better understanding of the DBVS process flowsheet from a chemical point of 
view is critical to success, both in building I high reliability production plant and 
in traubleshooting and recovering from any problems that occur during operation. 
T h e  feed compositions to be tested in the DBVS Project should reflect the 
spectrum of wastes expected to bc processed by bulk vitrification so that a 
comparison to other supplementaI trcatment alternatives can be made. 
Potential nuclear safety issues, including confinement strategy, impIementation of 
Integrated Safety Management, and response to off-normal events, need to bc 
resolved before startup of radioactive waste processing. 
The project needs to ensure that its designs and specifications mect thc required 
codes and standards. 
Thc pmccss to identify and manage risks has been developed, n d s  to be 
improvd, and must be effectively utilized in future stages of the project. 
The ERP identified: 
I3 technical issues which c d d  result in a failure of the DBVS dcmonstralion 
system to meet establishcd DBVS system performance requirements unless 
addressed prior to startup of hot operations 
26 areas of concern which may result in a change to design or require additional 
testing to determine if the design is adequate (now or later) 
13 sunrested improvements the project should consider to enhance safety, cost, 
schedulc, or efficiency during the test operations, and the potential transition to a 
production system downstream. 
1 
+ 
The EFW charter focused this review on the technical basis for the existing DBVS dcsign. 
This team did not review overall project cost and schedule estimates, nor did it 
specifically evaluate the efficacy of bulk vitrification technology implementation versus 
other alternative treatment pathways DOE may choose in the future. 
DOE and CH2M HILL are to be commended for commissioning this review at an early 
enough stage in the project so that the issues identified can be acted upon in a timely 
manner. The ERP recommends that the project conduct periodic reviews in the future at 
key decision points within the DBVS Project to asssure that these issues and others that 
may arise are identified and resolved. 
iv 
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1. Introduction 
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of River Protection (OW} is charged with the 
safe management, retrieval, treatment and disposal of over 53 million gallons of 
radioactive hazardous chemical wastes currently stored in 177 aging underground single- 
shell and double-shell tanks at the Hanford site near Richland, Washington. Currently, a 
large Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) is under constnrction to separate the retrieved tank 
waste into high-level waste (HLW) and low-activity waste (LAW) fractions and to vitrify 
those separated wastes for either onsite disposal as LAW, or for offsitc disposal at the 
proposed Yucca Mountain national repository as HLW. Completion of waste retrieval, 
treatment and disposal, as well as tank farm closure, wit1 eliminate much of the risk 
posed by the tank waste to the HanTord groundwater, the Columbia River, and the public. 
With its current design capacity, WTP, once fully operational, is expected to complete 
vitrification of the HLW in approximately 20-25 years. However, wih  WTP's existing 
design capacity for the LAW hclion, it is anticipated that a processing period 
significantly exceeding 25 years will be required. Additional LAW vitrification 
capability could be constructed to produce a balanced system that wauld result in a 
processing duration similar to that for ihe HLW fraction; acceleration of risk reduction 10 
the environment and public; and potentially significant savings to the taxpayer. 
I 
. 
DOE is considering approaches to provide this additionaI capability, either by expanding 
the existing WTP low-activity waste capability or by developing and deploying 
supplemental treatment technoIogies which might prove to be more cost effective. One 
of the candidates for supplemental treatment is an adaptation of In Container Vitrification 
Tbf (lCVm) technology available from AMEC Earth and Environmental, Xnc, (AMEC). 
DOE has contracted with CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc. (CH2M €ILL) to design and 
construct a full scale demonstration system to test this technotogy with radioactive tank 
waste. This Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System @BVS) project is c u m t l y  in 
design and development with pIms to initiate construction within the next two years. 
In order to assure itself and DOE that the DBVS design is robust and likely to be 
successfbl, CHZM HILL proposed to conduct an external review of the current state of 
the design and development of the DBVS system prior to the formal decision (CD-3) to 
sttart construction of the project. A group of 16 independent experts and consuItmts, 
representing a broad spectrum of technology experts, academia, and nuclear waste 
processing industry experts, was identified and chartered as the Expert Review Panel 
(ERP). ORP and DOE'S Office of Environmental Management participated in the 
selection of the Expert Review Pant1 members. 
The objective of the ERP was to determine whether the DEW system, as designed, could 
be cxpected to: 
meet the requirements defined in the system specification 
1 
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produce a waste product that mcets Hanford's Intcgrated Disposal Facility (IDF) 
disposal requirements 
receive opcrsltional approval by DOE auihorities and other regulators. 
1.1. Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Project Overview 
T h e  DBVS Project has conducted an extensive set of process tests ranging from crucible 
melts of both simulants and radioactive tank wastes, cold (non-radioactive) and hot 
(radioactive) engineering scale melts, and B series of fulI scalc cold melts. A series of 
supporting science and technology activities (e.g., glass formulation, investigation of 
unexpectcd second phase formation, and the pathway of technetium) have bcen 
conducted as well. 
To date, the vast majority of the supporting technology development and demonstration 
efforts have focused on glass formulation, performance of the melter system at a 
successively larger scale, and testing and troubleshooting the prototypic melt system. 
. The design of other major components of the demonshation system have Iargely relied on 
Iimited vendor testing or vendor performance ctaims, with few efforts directed towards 
scaled or full scalc testing of feed, material handling, or off-gas systems. In the current 
project plan, all integrated system testing will be conducted as part of the cold 
commissioning of the DBVS system. 
The project was completing the detailed DBVS dcsign in parallel with this ERP review. 
The detailed dcsign was completed by AMEC on July 28,2006. Similarly, a revised 
Documented Safcty Analysis was being prepared during this review. As a result, this 
review is a snapshot of a work-in-progress. 
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Description 
The DBVS is a full-scale test facility that will receive waste from single-shell tank 241-S- 
103, mix the waste with soil, dry the soiVwaste mixture, and blend in glass Ibnner 
additives to produce a dried wastdadditive mixture. The DBVS will then use the ICVA' 
process to convert the dried mixture into box= of vitrified waste. The I C P l  boxes will 
be cooled and interim stored until they are transferred to the Integrated Disposal Facility 
for disposal onsite. The DBVS will treat the process off-gas to a level that is protective 
of human health and the environment and meets applicabre requirements. Secondary 
liquid wastes will be filtered and sent to the EMuent Treatment Facility (ETF) for 
treatment and disposal. Figure I shows the relationship bctween the main process 
systems in the DBVS. These process systems inlcude: 
Clean Soil System 
Waste Receipt System 
Waste MixerlDryer and Condensate Recovery Systems 
4 Dried Waste Handling System 
In-Container VitrificationTAf System 
2 
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Off-Gas Treatment System (OGTS) 
Secondary Waste Sttrrage System. * 
Figure 1, Simplified BV FIow Diagram 
Clean Soil System 
The CIean Soil Sysfern receives and pneumatically conveys clean soil and glass forming 
additives to a total of firimpingement tanks that allow solid materials to be fed by 
gravity into the waste processing vessels. One tank will feed soil to the Waste 
Mixermryer, while the remaining thrcc soil tanks feed tapoff soil to three sepmte ports 
in the I C V  box. Two additional tanks will feed glass forming additives to the Waste . 
MixerDryer. 
Waste Receipt System 
The Waste Receipt System consists of a pump skid and three waste staging tanks. This 
system wiIl receive, sample, and transport waste from the 24 14-109 single-she11 tank to 
the Waste MixeriDryer and Condensate Recovery Systems. The pump skid Will transfer 
batches of waste from S-109 to one of three waste staging tank; for storage u t i 1  it is 
needed for processing. The waste will be sampled to verify that it cornpIies with the 
DBVS waste feed acceptance criteria. 
Waste MixerlDryer and Condensate Recovery Systems 
The Waste MixerlDryer converts waste liquid into a blended and dried feed product 
suiktbte for vitrification. Heat and vacuum will be used to dewater the waste feedsoil 
3 
Page 13 of 93 of DA03589930 
- - ._ - . -.. . 
WP-313 14 
mixture. During evaporation the Waste MixerlDryer will be operated at 60 "C (or higher) 
under a vacuum of approximately 660 mm Hg. The Waste MixerDyer wil1 mix its 
contents with rotating plows that direct the waste from the ends offhe mixeddryer 
towards it5 center. Thc evaporated water will be pulled through a sintered metal filter 
(SMF) to m o v e  particulates before the vapors reach the Condensate Recovery System. 
Particulates captured in the filter will be returned to the dryer drum via back-pulsing of 
the filters. 
Waste drying is a batch process with approximately eight dryer loads required for each 
I W f  box. Each dryer Ioad will begin with an initial charge of gravity-conveyed cIcan 
soiI via the impingement tank located abovc the dryct. After preheating the soil, waste 
fced will gradually be added from the waste staging tanks until the correct ratio of waste- 
to-soil is achieved. Once the entire batch of waste feed is added, the product will be 
dried to a target water content of about 3wt% water. GIass former additives will then be 
added and mixed With the dryer product, Finally, the Waste MixerlDryer will discharge 
the dried waste to the Dried Waste Handling System through a valve located on Ihe 
bottom of the dryer, then the batch pmcws will repeat, 
Dried Waste IImdling System 
The Dried Waste Handling System transfers the dried waste and soil mixture from the 
dryer to a waiting I C P i  box. The dried waste will be transferred into a discharge chute 
at a rate antrolled by a rotary vdve. As the rotary valve rotates, dried waste will enter a 
vacuum transfer line where gas veIocities will ensure that waste partides remain 
suspcnded and transported to one of two Dry Waste Receivers. The dried waste will then 
be gravity fed from t h e  Dry Waste Receivers into the I C P l  box. Both Dry Waste 
Receivers will be used to provide an even distribution of dried waste to the two entry 
points in the I C P [  box. The process is repeated for each dryer batch. 
I n  Container VitrMcationfM System 
The I C P  system is designed to receive a wastelsoil mixture, contain the bulk 
vitrification process, and serve as the final disposal container for the product. The ICVraI 
box will provide primary confinement for dried waste received from the drycr, molten 
glass during processing, and final waste product. 
The soihaste mix will be melted within the box, using electric power supplied through 
graphite electrodes. A starter path will be used to initiate the melt. On completion of the 
melt and after a cooling period, sumcicnt top-off soil will be added to emure that the box 
is at least 90 percent full and a nomina! 10-in. soil layer covers the melt. Once the 
chutes, electrical C O M ~ O W ,  ventilation and instrument harness have been disconnected, 
the I W M  box will be moved to the storage pad using an air pallet. 
Off-Gas Treatmcnt System 
The OGTS is used to coo& filter, scrub, and chemicarly treat the various process off-gas 
and vent sirems before exhaust fans discharge them through a monitor4 exhaust stack 
to the atmosphere. Off-gas produced during the I C P  process wil1 be drawn through 
4 
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two SMFs connected in series and the collected parliculates returned to the dryer by 
vacuum transfer and reintroduced into the melt process. 
Additional air drawn from the waste staging tank vents will be combined with lW 
process off-gas after the SMFs and fed into the off-gas wet scrubber treatment skid. The 
gas will be quenched with a caustic solution to cool it before entering the scrubber. This 
will remove most of the acidic gases (t.g., NO,, COz) and particulates. After the 
scrubber, the &gas will be passed through a mist eliminator, cooled in the condenser, 
and passed through a secand mist eliminator. Ambient air, air from the secondary waste 
storagc tank vents, and air from the dryer off-gas is combined with the scrubbed or-gas, 
then heated and passed through a series of two high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) 
filters. 
The filtered off-gas will then be drawn through a high-efficiency gas adsoxper (HEGA) 
filter and polishing filter, The HEGA filter is wed to remove residual radioactive iodine 
and organic carbon from the off-gas stream. The polishing filter will capture filter media 
partides that may exist in the HEGA filter eflluent and will prevent them fmm entering 
thc sclcctive catalytic reduction (SCR) unit. 
Afler passing through the HEGA filter skid, the off-gas will be mixed with filtered 
ambient air and drawn into the SCR unit, where it is preheated to bring it to the required 
operating temperature before entering h e  SCR reactor, As the off-gas passes through the 
SCR. NOx will bc reacted with ammonia in a catalyst bed to produce water vapor and 
nitrogen gas. A second catalytic bed will oxidize any remaining CO to CQ2. Hot off-gas 
h m  the SCR reactor WiIl pass through the exhaust side of the air-to-air heat exchanger 
to preheat thc incoming off-gas before being discharged h u g h  thc cxhaust stack. 
A b  the stack monitor has sampled and measured thc off-gas for the discharge flow, 
temperature, and contaminants being exhausted to thc atmosphere, the treated off-gas wil1 
be discharged through the stack by one of two exhaust fans. 
Secondary Waste Treatment System 
The Secondary Waste Treatment System provides for the storage of the secondmy liquid 
waste effluents from the dqer  condensate and off-gas scrubber solution, and load out of 
these eMuents for transfer to the ETF. Two staging tanks will be provided for interim 
storage of each of these secondary waste streams, and will be sized such that the 
secondary waste generated during the production of a single ICVTM box can be contained 
in two of the tanks (one for dryer condensate and one for off-gas scrubber solution). This 
approach will provide time for secondary waste sampling prior to transfer to the ETF. 
1.2. Review Process 
The members of the ERP divided into five focus areas: 
mission integration 
overalt process flowsheet 
5 
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vitrification and product qualification 
equipment design, including operations and maintenance 
Safety. 
Each focus ma developed I i n ~  of inquiry and review plans based on the approved 
charter. The charter posed five primary questions to be addressed by the ERP, 
Are there any flaws in the current design or operational plans that would prevent 
the DBVS system from meeting safety or technology demonstration objectives? 
rn Will the DBVS system meet minimum product quality and demonstration 
production rate requirements? 
0 Is the technical basis of the DBVS flow sheet sound? 
Is the DBVS Equipment and Facility design basis adequate to bound the 
construction and operating costs for the demonstration? 
What are the primary outstanding safety and technical riskduncertainties for the 
DBVS? 
Relevant DBVS Project management, technicnl basis, and dcsign documents provided by 
the project werc reviewed. DBVS Project management, technical, and operations staff 
were then interviewed and provided additional information and clarification of the data 
originaIly provided to the team. Since the design and development efforts of the project 
were ongoing, the DBVS Project team typically provided information that bridged h e  
gap between the released project documcnts and the current state of the project. In this 
. way thc ERP was able to consider the most up-to-date information available for this . 
review. Preliminary draft information develop4 by the E W  was provided to the project 
staff for factual accuracy reviews prior to finalizing this report. 
Even though the project was in the midst of a major project design completion effort, 
staff and subcontractors from OW, CHZM HILL, and AMEC were very open and 
cooperative. IndividuaIs from the project spent many hours with the ERP and were very 
responsive to requests for additional information and briefings. Without this cooperation, 
the ERP would not have been able to complete zt quality review in the time availablk 
1.3, Review of the Demonstration BuIk Vitrification System Ttehnical 
Basis 
Afier the initial document review and onsite meetings, the ERP teyicw subteams 
prepared an initial set of findings and issues which were reviewed with the project staff 
for factual accuracy, and in some cases additional clarification. Based on the results of 
these discussions, issues, mas of concern, and recommendations for improvement were 
documented in a draft version of this document, This document draft was also provided 
to the project for factual accuracy review. The document was finalized in September 
2006. 
6 
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The ERP established four categories for grouping of issues. 
Fatal flaws -the issue Will cause failure of the DBVS, and cannot be resolved (no 
fatal flaws were identified) 
Technical issues -the identified issue will result in a failure of the DBVS to meet 
established DBVS system, mission, or safety performance requirements unless 
addressed prior to start of hot operations of thc DBVS facility (see Table 1) 
Areas of concern - the identified wncem may result in a change to design, or 
may require additional testing to determine if the design is adequate (now or later) 
(see Table 2) 
Suggested improvements - improvements that the project should consider to 
improve safety, cost, schedule, or efficiency during the t a t  operations 
The report discusses each of the five focus areas, emphasizing specific points within each 
area inchding: mission integration of the DBVS Project with the overall completion of 
the ORP mission and the projects overall risk management approach; flowsheet technical 
basis; equipment design and specifications review; thc secondary waste system; 
operations and maintenance approach and impact on design; and finally, the strategy for 
the development and approval of the facility authorization basis and safety management 
programs. 
The original detailed team reports are included in RPP-3 1337. These individual team 
reports include more detailed analysis used to prepm the summary findings of the DBVS 
Project. The reader is encouraged to review these for a complete discussion of the DBVS 
flowsheet, equipment design, vitrification system, safety programs, and risk management 
approach. To avoid misinterpreting what an individual member intended to convey, the 
write-ups have not been edited for writing style or issue terminology; nor to remove any 
concerns, regardless ofwhether they were ultimately classified as Technical Issues or 
Areas of Concern in the final report. 
All of the team leads, together with some of the team members, participated in the 
categorization of issues in the main body of the report. The main body of this report 
(RPP-31314) rcpresents a consensus of the ERP. The ERP wishes to emphasize that the 
contents of WP-3 1337 should be considered as working documents of team members. 
Tablcs I and 2 indicate the section of the report where the corrcsponding issue discussion 
can be found, including potential mitigation for all issues. The order of the issue 
presentation does not necessarily reflect their relative importance. 
7 
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Ttchnfcal Issue Statemcnt of Technlral tssue Report Section 
# 
# I  
Technical Issue T h e  DWS, I s  currently planned, will not Mission 
Technical Issue lnsuflicitnt in!egrated s p m  tcsting prior to Mission 
completely meet all objectives assigned it in 
the Justification of MissionNed 
radioactive DBVS operations is planned. #2 
Technical Issue 
#3 off-normal conditions. 
#4 
#5 
There is no present plan Tor recovgr from 
and operations) is too complex. 
(plan and hardware) is not dcsigncd to gather 
Flowsheet 
Technical Issue The entire PDVS (flowsheet, system design Fhwshcet 
Technical Issue The sampling and data acquisition system Flowsheet 
RPP-3 13x4 
Section No. 
2.2 
2.2 
3 
3 
3 
Table 1. DBVS-ERP Technical Issues. 
Tccbnicil Issue 
#6 
Technical Jasuc 
#7 
important process and dcsign infamatian. 
The soil will not transport as currently Equipment Design and 
designcd. Specification -Solids 
Handling 
The soil will bridge in Ihe hopper and not Equipment Design and 
feed the dryer. Specification - Solids 
4.3 
4.3 
Equipment Design and 
Specification - MkerlDryer 
Technical Issue 
#S 
4.3 Technical Issue 
#9 
Equipment Dcsign and 
Specification -Vitrification 
Technical Issue 
#IO 
4.4 
Bccaue of the unceminty in the panicle 
size, moisture content, ctc. o f  the asdried 
material, it i5 dificult to evaluafc the solids 
fced system dcsign. 
There is considerable uncertainty with regard 
to the consistency of the dried material and 
how it will be controlltd. 
Fomtion of secondary phases is not 
suficiently understood for reliable process 
control. 
Technical Issue 
#I5 
Specification - Solids 
Handling 
proper fIow. 
The sintered metal fillers will frequently 
blind, with a significant risk of release of 
eonhmimtion. 
I I I 
Technical Issue I Failure to close the technetium mss balance I Equipment Design rnd I 4.5 
#L1 
Technical Issue 
#la  
threatens thc viability of bulk vitrification as 
a supplemntal treatment technology. 
Design criteria for thc OGTS have nal been 
clcarly dcfined. 
Specification - Vitrification 
Equipment Design and 
Specification - Off-Gas 
I I 
Technical Issue I Testing requirements in equipment I Equipmcnt Dcsign and 
#I3 specifications have been in;ldequatcIy 
defmed. 
I I 
Technical Issue I Potentially I q e  variations in system I Equipment Design and 
#14 . component pressure losses and the hysteresis 
within the control system could result in 
unacceptable response time to achieve 
Skdfication - Off-Gas 
F' 
I 
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Safety 
Safety 
safety 
Safety 
Technical Issue 7.1 
7. I 
7.1 
7.1 
#16 
Technical Issue 17 
R P P 3  13 14 
Testing and safcty analysis have not 
adequately addresscd the IWfM melt box 
pcrfomnct for containment of the melt 
product, volatilc radionuclidca, and 
eneratcd NO,. w 
contain the dried waste under normal and 
accidcnt conditions is not yet fully 
understood and defensible. 
The DBVS Project plans to assign 
operational responsibility to a subxonmctor 
who has little formal nuclear facility 
own tine exneerience. 
Project uncertainty with various pottions of 
the unit operations and process chcmisq 
may heighten safety vulnerability under 
abnormal conditions. 
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Table 2. DBVS-ERP h a s  of Concern. 
I 
Area of 
theern 
#7 
Area of 
Concern 
#S 
A m  of 
Concern 
#9 
Tcmpcratures predicted in h e  mixeddryer 
conminer during hot weather may not allow 
for the proper operation of controls and 
equipment. 
The lack of a validated approach for control 
ofthe ICP process putsthe project's 
sbiliiy to proceed to radioactive operatiam at 
risk. 
A fced qualification stcp is ncedcd as part of 
the process control plan. 
Equipment Design and 
Specification - MixerKlryer 
Equipment Design and 
Spccifmion - Vitrification 
Equipment Dcsign a d  
Specification - Vitrification 
I 
.. - I I 
Area of I The lack of prototypic tesling prevents Ihc I Equipment &sign and 
Area of 
Concern 
Arca of 
Equipment mnuracturtrs' standard praciicc 
appcars to have taken precedence over d c  
ebinpfiance for the 0~1s. 
T h e  Wet Scrubber specification does wt 
I Concern I reauh  performance testina to demnsmte 
#12 thd spee'ified removal efficiencies 
Area of Design Criteria for the HEPA fillers have not 
Equipment Design and 
Spccificatkn - Off-Gas 
Equipmcnt Dcsign and 
Specification - OfT4as 
Equipment Design and 
Conem been established Specification - Off-Gas 
#I3 
Arra of Equipment Design and 
Concern Specification - Off-Gas 
# 14 
Area of 
Concern 
Carbon cells for HEGA films do not m e t  
h e  required residence time as specified in 
the Procurement Specification and ASME 
AG-I &de. 
There exists a potential for a charcoal fire 
due to concentrations of NO, in the HEGA 
Equipment Design and 
Spccificaiion - Off-Gas 
#15 skid. 
Scction No. 
3 
3 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.4 
4.4 
43 
4.5 
4.5 
4.6 
4.b 
4.6 
4.6 
4.6 
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Concern 
#2 1 
Area af 
Concern 
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been &;eloped and incorpontcdht~ ihe 
demonstration facility rtquircments: . 
Rcadincss requirements for uItimatc hot 
opcrations may be undcrestimattd 
I 
The large number of TSR-level safety 
systems and DBVS-specific administrative 
Area of 
Concern 
Concern 
Safcty 
Concern 1 #IS 
&ea of 
Concern 
#2S 
h a  of 
Concern 
Concern 
Concern 
complexity. 
The documentcdrationalm for rhc rtviscd 
Hazard Cattgarizalian are insufticient 
Safety documentation and analysis docs not 
urovide for a comlete accountinpl of 
Safcty 
Safcty 
The OGTS emergency by-pass filtcr system 
could quickIy h a d  with particulate during 
upset conditions, resuIdng in a filter failure 
and rclcase oleontaminants to the 
atmospheres. 
There appears to be littlc, if any, dcsign 
o p h h t i o n .  
The scmbber system may not bc able to treat 
uncxpecicdly large amounts of gases and 
solids, resulting in wcceptabk amounts of 
material beinE directed to ihc ETF 
Assumptions about I y p s  and amounts of 
chemical entering the Secondary Waste 
Trcatmtn t S ystcm 
The potential Tor future use of the DBVS 
facilify as a oinglc line production facility 
and gap filler capability might not be 
I adequately addrcsscd in the existing design. 
I An adequate maintemnce shtcgy has not Area of 
#22 
Area of 
Concern 
#23 
Insufkicnt consideration to accumulation o f  
radioactive materials throughout the DDVS 
could lead to avoihbk radiation exposure 
during qmtions and extra eomplmtiry of 
thc decontamination and dccommissioning 
Equipment-f is ip and 
Specification - Qff-Gas 
' Equipmcni Dcsign and 
Smcification - Ovcmll 
~ & r n  Section 
Secondary Waslc Treatment 
Secondary Waste Treabnent 
Operations and Maintenance 
Operations and Maintenance 
Operalions and Maintenance 
Safely 
I cbmols may be excessive rrom the standpoint of human factors and operational 
1 #26 I lhemicals used aid gencrated by& DBVS 1 
4.6 
4.7 
5 
5 
4.2 
4.2 
6.2 
7.1 
7.1 
7.1 
7.1 
1 1  
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2. Mission Integration 
Completion of the overall River Protection Project mission requires the treatment of over 
53 million gallons of radioactive wastes currently stored in aging single and double shell 
tanks at the Hanford Site. OW’S plan is to retrieve the wastes and to pretreat as 
necessary to meet regulatory and performance requirements to produce a HLW ked and 
a LAW feed. Both of these streams are to be vitrified, with the vitrified HLW fraction 
destined for disposal at proposed Yucca Mountain, and the much larger volume of 
vitrified LAW planned to be disposed of onsite in the IDF. To meet overali schedule 
objectives to complete the waste treatment mission in 20-25 years, additional LAW 
treatment capacity is required. 
2.1. Justification of Mission Need 
To a great extent, the overall mission drivers are captured in the Justification of Mission 
Need (JMN) for the DBVS system, approved in July 2006. The mission need document 
requires that the DBVS Project: 
Process approximately 190,000 gallons of Tank S-f 03 waste into fifty 100 metric 
ton boxes of vitrified product. 
Store and dispose of these boxes at Hanford’s Integrated Disposal Facility (TDF) 
Evaluate the waste form characteristics. 
Gather pilot plant operability data, and 
Develop the overall life cycle system perromance of bulk vitrification and 
produce a comparison of the bulk vitrification procws to building a second LAW 
lmmobilization facility or other supplemental treatment alternatives as provided 
in M-62-08. 
To fully evahate thc context of meeting thesc primary project objectives it is important to 
understand the important O W  mission requirements that this project needs to address. 
Treatment Strategy Drivers 
Currently, OW’S baseline strategy contemplates dcpIoyment of supplemental 
technologies in two distinct phases. Initially, a 4-line system would be constructed in 
West k e a ,  along with the needed pretreatment capability. OW’S strategy for utilization 
of the West Area supplemental treatment is based on the variable nature of Hanford tank 
waste, which derives from its complex history. A selected subset of tanks has been 
identified as likely feed to the West Area Production Scale System. These tanks are 
characterized by their absence of organic complexants and, in general, are lower in 
cesium concentration due to previous waste processing campaigns done to remove 
cesium from existing tank wastes. 
12 
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A second 4-line system would be built in conjunction with the WTP in East Area. This 
system would process wastes pretreated in the WTP facility and, in general, will see the 
s m e  feed materials as the WTP LAW facility. It wouId allow utiIizatim of the full 
pretreatment capacity that is designed into the  WTP Pretreatment Facility. 
ERP considers that the demonstration of the applicability of bulk vitrification as a viable 
technology for both of these future potential applications is assigned to the DBVS via the 
JMN. 
Pilot Ptan t Data 
In addition to the JMN’s assignment of the development of life-cycle cost and schedule 
estimates, the full scale production sysfems require additional design data supporting feed 
preparation, glass formulation over the range of expccted fecds for the mission, and off- 
gas treatment requirements. The JMN assigns the development of the necessary pilot 
plant data to the DBVS Project. 
lhnford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Ordcr Drivers 
In its current system and baseline lifecyde plans, approximately 4040% of the LAW 
needs to bc treated by this additional capacity, DOE and the State of Washington have 
established a milestone that dcscribes the decision process necessary to select thc 
technology to be utilized for this additional capacity (M-62-08). This milestone describes 
the information necessary to conduct a comparison between any proposed supplemental 
treatment and a second WP-type LAW facility. The information needs include: 
b 
a 
‘ I . .  .Thc results of all waste fonn performance data (compared against the 
performance of bomsilicatc glass) for all the treatment technologies being 
cansidered; performance data will be adequate to make decisions as to the 
acceptability of any proposed waste form for the waste being considered, and 
description of the considered treatment technologies (including size, throughput, 
technical viability, and l ik  cycle cost tstirnatcs) 
,,.a discussion of Waste Treatment Plant throughput commitments and the 
reaIistic potential for enhancing the throughput of currently planned melters, 
proposed additional melters and potential second generation melters installed at 
first meIter change out 
. . . Life-cycle cost estimates that indicate projected funding requirements through 
completion of the River Protection Project mission, a schedule for construction 
and operation of proposed new facilities andor enhancements to the WTP, and 
projected throughput for each facility.. .” (Ref Hanford Federal Facility 
Agreement and Consent Order M-62-08). 
According to the DBVS JMN, the DBVS Fbject is required to develop the necessary 
infomation associated with the comparison of supplemental treatment alternatives. 
13 
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2.2. Mission Integration Evaluation 
Given the primary objectives that the DBVS Project has bccn assigned in the overall O W  
strategy, and the more specific objectives directly assigned in the JMN, the ERP expects 
the following to be addressed by the project in either work completed or planncd. 
I 
I 
Aproduction plan to process approximately 190,000 gallons of Tank S-109 waste 
into approximately fifty 100 metric ton boxes of vitrified product.. 
Adequatc product qualification and performance assessment to assurc that these 
boxcs can be disposed in the D F  facility when it becomes apmtional. 
A product qualification suategy that addmses the entire a g e  of feeds expected 
for both the west area and east area systems. 
A p k t  plant stratem and plan that addresses all aspects of the data requircd to 
design and cost the production scale facility. 
A p h t  plant design that complies with DOE nuclear safety requirements 
including I compliant authorization safety basis and effective safety mmagemmt 
P * V .  
Planncd activities to develop all elements of the life cycle comparison, including 
preliminary production scak system design and cost estimates, performance and 
cost data for other supplemental technologies, and cost of a second LAW facility. 
As dcscnbed earlier in the process description, the DBVS Project has aggressively 
pursued the development and demonstration of thc applicability of bufk vitrification as a 
viabk waste treatment technology. However, until recently, the focus of the project has 
been aImost entirety on glass formulation and successive scale up ofthe melt system 10 
support ?he initial 50 box operation, with much less attention on scale up and 
qualification of the remainder of the DBVS. Outside of the mclt system, testing has 
gcneraIly invofved limited vendor testing or reliance on vendor performance claims as to 
the applicability of fccd preparation, material handling, or off-gas treatment technology 
and equipment. While successfully cold testing the melt system at full scale, even this 
testing was conducted without prototypical processes and equipment for feed preparation, 
mixeddryer operation, material transfer, and off-gas systems. 
Currcnt project plans would not conduct additional prototypical testing of the feed 
preparation, mixtrldryer system, material transfer, and off-gas systems until the DBVS 
equipment is installed at the demonstration site. Sub-system and integrated system cold 
testing would be done with the installed DBVS equipment prior to commencement of a 
formal operational readiness review and start of hot operations. 
The project has conducted a range of glass formulation experiments, and has developed 
plans to spike the S-109 feed with constituents to represent a wider range of tank 
compositions. The project has not yet developed plans to address the feed qualification, 
feed composition and vslriabiIity of the east area system, inchding potentia1 flowsheet 
modifications of the WTP pretreatment system. 
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At this stage, a pilot plant testing plan that clearIy d a t e s  the requirements of the 
production scale system design back to thc DBVS Project is not evident, nor is my such 
activity pIanned within the project baseline, Figure 2 demonsfrates that, to date, the 
project has spent a majority of time testing the DBVS system melter with littIe or no time 
beinE spent on testing ofthe feed and off-gas systems. 
Feed -> 
1 
I 
I 
I 
Applicability to 
DBVS 
I 
I 
0 
0% 
Melter 
100 % 
-> Off-Gas 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
25 % 
Figurc 2. The applicability of thc development and demonsttation data cotlccted to date 
in the DBVS design, 
Tcchnfcal Issue # 1: The DBVS, 8s currently planned, will not compretely meet a11 
objectives assigned It in the Justification of Mission Need 
For the first t h e  objectives in the 3MN, the project has dcveloped measurable success 
criteria that will allow an unambiguous determination that the objective has been met. 
These are carried through into the Integrated Testing and Evaluation Management Plan 
(ITEMP), so that there is clear evidence that the project will meet the objectives. 
For the overall life cycle and pilot plant data objectives, there are neither measurable 
success criteria nor items in the lTEMP that clearly correspond to these objectives. 
Potential Mitigation: For colIection of data for system design, the project should 
identify the data it needs and then ensure that such data is generated. 
Data needed for decisions that will: ultimately be made by DOE presents a much larger 
problem. DOE shautd provide the project with specific guidance on the oomplete set of 
data needed to make decisions relating to Supplemental Treatment, and the down- 
selection of technology. It does not appear that this has been done, except at a very high 
level. The project then should convert DOE'S data needs into test objectives identified in 
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the ITEMP, and would do welt to consider formally including thcm in a Dab Quality 
Objective (DQO). 
As an example, the data needed for a decision on the need for supplomental treatment 
shouId include a determination of how much of the Hanford LAW can successfully be 
treated by bulk vitrification. To do this adequately, the project must define the 
compositional and process operating range over which the technology can be expected to 
be successful. If the project faits to do this, DOE will not be nbIe to adequately estimate 
the Iifcqcle cost of the technology and the number of waste packages that will be 
produced for comparison with other alternatives. 
Technical Issue # 2: Insufficient integrated system testing prior to radioactive DBVS 
operations is planned 
Thc integrated system testing prior to radioactive DBVS operations currcntly ideniified in 
project documentation is limited to 2 cold containers. Neither the scopc of the testing nor 
the objectives of the tests are adequately defined. 
There has been no testing of the dryer system (the system that will deliver thc dried feed 
to the meltcr) nor of the off-giu system. The latter is particularly of concern because of 
the system's complexity. Adequate control and understanding of the process must be a 
prerequisite to beginning radioactive operations; two tesh will not provide the 
information needed for process control. Should process upsets occur during radioactive 
operations, corrective actions will be much more difficult to correctly formulate and 
implement than during non-radioactive operations. 
A suficient number of process upsets lparlicularly if they resulted in release of 
radioactive materials) could result in substantial dclays or in termination of the DBVS 
Project due to worker exposure and safety, or the perception of an uncontrollable process. 
Potentiat Mitigation: 
Perform additional testing at both thc engineering- and full-scate beyond that 
currently envisioned for the DBVS prior to radioactive operations is necessary. 
Perform integrated testing of the lCVm process in combination with the feed 
'dryer and OGTS to demonstrate adequate processing of the dried material. 
Address the effect of the dried feed system on bulk vitrification production rate, 
process stabitity, salt behavior, pressure stability, and off-gas treatment 
performance prior to integrated DBVS operations. 
Expand DBVS operations to complete development of integrated system controIs, 
balancing of the off-gas system, and training operators. 
Detail the non-radioactive testing necessary to determine how to operate the 
DBVS, and the testing to establish that the project is ready to proceed to .  
radioactive operations. 
In addition, the operational safety experience and requirements, used at the Tank Farms, 
should bc integrated into the operation of the DBVS Project. 
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2.3. Risk Management 
A key element of this review was an assessment of the adequacy of the risk management 
proccss being used for DBVS. This is n critical part of any projcct in which management 
defines and quantifies the project risks, decides an actions plans (accept, mitigate, 
eliminate) for each risk, and assigns the risk to a party for action. 
Risk management is a vitally important part of the project management procas, as 
required by DOE Order 413.3-1. Improper risk management will increase the costs, 
schedule, and performance of the project. For example, ifpermitting is completed later 
than scheduled, the costs of the project will increase for severat reason5 including Ihc 
need to providc project management support for a longer period of time, 
The DBVS risk management process major functions are: 
Risk Identification 
Risk Analysis 
Risk Prioritization 
RiskResponse 
Management of Risk Infomation. 
The current DBVS risk mamgmncnt approach is team-based. The team provides data 
and technicat txperlise during the conduct of a risk analysis. The function ofthe risk 
management team may continue for the life of the program or project. The DBVS project 
manager implements the requirements of this procedure, assigning and assuring timely 
pakipation of required personnel for risk analyses, and adequately pIming and 
budgeting risk management activities in the basefine. The risk management team usually 
meets once per month to discuss and analyzc the status of the project from a risk 
pcrspcctive. Onc of the key action items of this monthly meeting is to identify a risk 
owner. This party is delegated responsibility for managing a specific risk event and is 
responsible for the successful completion of risk mitigation actions. 
The ERP evaluated the DBVS Risk Management program and had h e  following 
observations. 
The consequence vaIues in the risk management matrix are outdated 
The consequence values in the risk management matrix are outdated. For 
instance, risks that could result in a project cost increase of S t million or a 
schedule delay of 1 month are categorized as ‘high risk.” 
Now that the DBVS Project’s budget is more than three times its initial budget, a 
$1 million variance is proportionately much smaller. The problem with using the 
current, outdated set of consequenca is that some r isks  will be rated “high” or 
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“’very high” when they should not. Such overstating will divert management’s 
attention away from the most important risks and bog down decision-making. 
As a result, the ERP recommends that the DBVS Project team reset the 
consequence vaIues to higher threshold levels to reflect current project budget and 
schedule. 
rn Somc risk events may not be recognized and addressed in a tImeIy manncr 
The DBVS Project management tcam uses a risk register to routinely (typically 
once per month) address individual risks. Once a risk is mitigated, it is 
transferred to B ‘4clclosed” list. Risks on tbat closed list are re-evaluated only when 
the Risk Management Plan is revised. Revision 0 was pubIishcd in February 
2004, Revision 1 was published seventeen months later (July ZOOS), and Revision 
2 was published four months after that (Navember 2005). The consequencc of 
untimely review of closed risks is  that they may reappcar and the project 
management team would not be aware of their presence. That in turn could have 
negative cost, schedde. and performance consequences to the project. 
The ERP recommends that the DBVS Project review this dosed list at least every two 
months, and that it put previously closed risks back on the active risk register if they have 
recurred or have increased in significance, 
18 
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3. Process Flowsheet 
Flowsheets are a representation of the entire DBVS process. They incIude many proccss 
steps or features that are common to more than one pmcess subsystem. Flowsheet issues 
relate to process chemistry; flowsheet presentation; DBVS feed composition; chemistry- 
rclated knowledge required for procedures to recover from proccss upsets, accidents, or 
process improvement; DBVS complexity; recovery from o ff-normal operating 
conditions; sampling; instrumcntation; decontamination factors; and feed 
characterization. 
Technical Issue # 3: There is no present plan for rccovery horn ofr-normal 
conditions 
Thc project has not yct addressed the issuc of recovery from off-normal operating 
conditions. There are several circumstances in which off-normal conditions can occur. 
For example: operators may fail to fdlow operating instructions leading to process 
upsets; intactable solids may plug the dryer requiring process shutdown andh 
equipment removal; or emergencies that involve releases from the off-gas system 
containing Ievefs of toxic or radioactivc materials that exceed the permit allowances 
requiring process shutdown. 
Failure to provide for recovery from off-normal, emergency, or accident conditions can 
result in unacceptable expcnse and delay of the project as well as potential harm to plant 
and offsite pcrsonncl. See Safety Technical Issuc #l9 for additional discussion on 
rccovery of off-normal events. 
Potential Mitigatation: The ERP recommends the following actions. 
Prepare a computer mode! of the DBVS that can predict the consequences of off- 
normal conditions. 
Prepare an action plan with corrective proc~ss actions for the ofhiorma1 
conditions. 
Prepare a manual that covers all of the necessary safety-related reporting and 
administrative steps. 
I Delineate the steps required io record the nature of the occurrence, its 
consequences and the corrective actions taken. 
Technical Issue # 4: The entire DBVS (flonshtet, systcm design and operations} is 
too romplcx 
-The ERP believcs that the inherent complexity of the processes embodied in the DBVS 
flowsheet - as manifested in the many interdependent valves, pressures, flowrates, 
temperatures, and alarms -will make the DBVS very dimcult to operate. The DBVS 
operators wilI need to be highly skiIlcd and trained to successfully operate the syskrn. 
There are numerous instances where opening and closing one valve depends on opening 
and/or closing another valve. Thwe vafves in turn control gas pressures and flows 
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throughout thc entire system. Although this interrelated system of vdves appccvs to be 
we11 thought out, it is the sheer complexity ofthe system that troubles thc ERP. 
There is a significant potential impact of the DBVS Safety Systems and Administrative 
Controls on the operability of the system. See Safety Area of Concern #24 for additional 
discussion on Technicat Safety Requirements. 
The complexity of the DBVS is manifested in other ways through the project, for 
example: 
The project does not appear to have 8 comprehensive sampling plan for the entire 
DBVS directed toward establishing the effectiveness of the process controls, 
providing information necded for construction and operation of a treatment plant, 
and determining the retention of tcchnetium and cesium as well as vapors and 
soIids throughout the DBVS. Sampling plans developed to date focus on waste 
form qualification. 
FaiIure to produce and put into use a comprehensive sampling plan will result in 
failure to acquire information necessary for DBVS qualification md subsequent 
construction of an acceptable large-scale plant. 
L Because the presentation of the flowsheet is very detailed and prescnted on 
scveral pages that require referring back and forth, it is difficult to grasp thc 
flowsheet' in its entirety. Ahhaugh the amount of detaii prsented is useful IO the 
design engineers and vendors, it is not suitable for use by decision makers and 
others interested mote in understanding the essential features of the DBVS 
process as they relate to safety, cost, and operating difficulty. 
Failure to present an easily understood flowshcet will make it difficuIt, or 
impossible, for the non-specialist to evaluate the DBVS process with respect to 
operability, cost, and suitability relative to alternative technologies. 
Potential Mitigation: The EEW recommends the following actions. 
I 
0 
b 
Isolate parts of the system to the extent feasibte, such that the extensive 
interconnections and interdependencies are reduced. This will enhance system 
operability and maintainability. 
Perfom a control optimization exercise to examine the origin of each Technical 
Safety Requirement (TSR) level control, identify the associated 
analysidevatuation conscmtisms, determine the sensitivity to the conscmatisms, 
and evaluate the necessity of each of the mnswvatisms. 
Examine any design attributes that are driving the need for a control and assess 
whether there are reasonable alternatives that would result in simpler or fcwer 
controls. 
Evaluate the frequency and magnitude of surveillances, readings, recordings, and 
adjustments in the safety administrative control programs for viability and human 
factors issues. 
Update the project Human Factors analysis, consistent with the latest control 
suite. 
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Develop and employ a comprehensive m p l i n g  plan for the entire DBVS that 
will meet the project mission goals. 
Develop a simplified version of the flowsheet for technical communication 
purposes. It should show schematically on one sheet a11 the process steps and 
major equipmmt pieces (Le., volumes, masses, concentrations, flowates, 
temperatures, and important radionuclides). It should not show valves or other 
.equipment items unless hey are essential to understanding opention of the 
System. 
Technical Issue # 5: Tbe sampling and data acquisition system (pIan and hardware) 
Is not designed to gather Important process arid design informalion 
A project objective is to provide the data necessary to evaluate the performance ofthe 
waste dryer, material handling system, process vessels, and OGTS, For the “50 
container” campaigns, the sampling plan, to date, is directed at satisfying the DQO 
cornpliancdproduct quality requirement. The number of sampling points and associated 
devices considered in the current design of the facility arc not sufficient to support 
Research, Development and Demonstration N & D )  activities and acquisition of 
important process knowledge. 
Failure to provide for adequate sampling will compromise the ability of the DBVS to 
accompfsh its basic mission -provide thc information needed to determine the technicat 
feasibility of the DBVS and to permit a comparison of DBVS with alternative low-level 
waste treatment technologies. 
Potential Mitigation: 
Radioactive JYaste in the DB VSRecerjlr Tanks 
Recirculate waste at a higher flow rate. 
Install sampling systems far from any pipe b a d .  
I 
ICFS - Core Drilling System 
Obtain truly representative samples of the finished vitrified product. 
OJ-GUS 
rn Sample the off-gas at the stack during operations using continuous monitoring 
equipment and record sample data. (The ERP notes that the current design docs 
not include any samplers h a t  could support:l) identification of the chemical 
reactions occurring, 2) tracking of the entrainmen~accumulations of 
radionuclides, and 3) determination of all the needs for a production facility (per 
DQO Section 41.3.3). 
Secondary Liquid Waste 
Sampla are manually taken from the four liquid waste tanks by dipping a 1 -1iter 
sampIe bottle through a sample port focated atop each tank. That is acceptable for 
a test facility but the ERP believes that a better system should be used for a future 
production facility. 
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When n comprehensive sampling pIm is available, an evaluation should be madc 
of the current instrumentation design to determine if this instrumentation is 
sufficient to support RD&D type test campaigns. In addition, a complete 
instrumentation and control performance evaluation is needed to ensure that the 
control of the DBVS systcm can bc maintained. 
Area of Concern # I : Decontamination calcuIated for Technetium and Cesium 
across the DBVS arc qucstionabIy large 
Calculating decontamination factors for individual separation steps, when combined to 
obtain an overall system decontamination of the waste streams for technetium and 
cesium, may yield factors that are unexpectedly large. The types of relatively simple 
decontamination process steps used in the DBVS are not usually capable of achieving thc 
overall degree of decontamination cited (Id to 1 06) for vapors, gases, and other physical 
forms that may be expected for technetium and cesium in some parts of the system. 
An unrealistic assessment of decontamination fxtors, ispccially if they are questionabbly 
large, can Icad to potential radiation ovwexposures and radioactivity relases to the 
environment that are neither A M R A  (as low as reasonably achievable) nor within state 
or Federal acceptance limits. 
Potential Mitigation: 
Re-examine the decontamination factors for the various process steps in ordcr 10 
ensure that they are valid and that the melhod of combining them to obtain an 
overall system decontamination factor is valid. This can be accomplished by: 
o Sampling the filter both before and after fittration to dctermine if the 
decontamination factors we valid. 
o Obtain material balances for technetium and cesium across the DBVS. 
Area o€ Concern # 2: There is a lack of a basic understanding of thc process 
chemistry 
Chemical data have not yet been obtained to enable an understanding of chemically- 
based observations during tests. Exceptions are the chemical analyses performed on the 
vitrified mass itself. 
The DBVS tests have been conducted almost exclusively in connection with the behavior 
of the 1CVm box and its contents, with very little attention paid to understanding the 
chemistry of what is happening in the remaining process steps. To date, nearly nfl of the 
experimental tests have addressed the process tests runs phenomenologicalIy and 
descriptively rather than chemicarly, 
If the system experiences off-normal conditions that lead to unanticipated behavior of 
technetium andlot cesium it will: be very di fficuIt to b o w  what corrective actioos to take 
in the absence of chemical knowledge about the chemical species involved. Likewise, it 
will be difficult to know how to improve the process in the absence of chemical 
knowledge. 
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The chemical species of technetium as it moves through the DBVS has not been 
experimentally determined, but are inferred from known technetium chemistry. The 
identity of the chemical species of technetium in the glass is unknown except by 
inference. There is experimental evidence that technetium concentrates at the 
meltlmullite box interface. It has been speculated that sulfate ion plays a role in this 
behavior. However, there is no analflica1,data to support that specuhfion. It is believed 
that technetium leaving the lCVm will deposit on the stee1 mesh filters and on the system 
piping, but there is no experimental evidence to determine whether it deposits as Tc207, 
8s an adhered (and uknown) chemical species on the piping, or as a deposit on the large 
mass of solids fiat arc presumed to be trapped by the filters. There is no experimental 
information on the nature of the technetium presumed to be trapped in the off-gas 
scrubber. Similar statements are true for the nature and behavior of cesium. 
Failure to understand the chemistry underlying observations poses the risk that when 
there i s  an unexpected occurrence of a chcmical nature (or 8n accident), there is likely to 
be Iittle or no understanding of the underlying reasons for the occurrence. Consequently, 
there will be no rational basis upon which to base corrective or recovery actions. 
Furthmore, thcre will be no basis on which to make chemistry-dated process 
improvements. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that additional chemical information be 
obtained both by sampling to obtain chemical information during and after DBVS test 
runs and by laboratory experiments. In all cases, acquisition of chemical data should be 
driven by a need to understand observations madc during t he  test runs and have the goal 
of furthering undcrstmding of process chemistry a5 it rclates to meeting DBVS mission 
goals. 
Suggested Improvement: The DBVS Project should consider additional 
charactcrhation with regard to organic materials Iikcly to be present in the waste 
feed 
Knowledgc of the baseline chemical and radionuclide composition of waste transferred 
from Tnnk S-I 09 to DBVS reIies on &he S-109 Best-Basis Inventory obtained from the 
Tank Waste Information Network System and on analyses of samples taken during ?he 
engineering and full-scalc vitrification tests. 
There has not been enough attention paid to the presence of organic compounds in same 
of the melter feeds, apecia1Iy in real tank wastes that are candidates to be treated by the 
full scale process facility other than S-109. The ERP questions the use of allyl alcohol as 
a surrogate for all the organic cornpounds that will be present. Organic compounds 
present in tank wastes other than those from S- t 09 wilt have very different compositions 
from the wastes in S-10s. Some ofcompounds will decompose into inorganic 
compounds that may enter the off-gas system, depositing on the filters and recycling back 
into the melter (e.g., phosphates and sulfates). In addition, there wilt be complexants 
such as ethylene diamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA) and sirniIar compounds presmt in same 
of the wastcs. Decomposition products of these compounds will contribute to the 
composition of the gases and vapors in the plenum above the meIter and change the 
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chemistry and redox potential in that region. This cauld affect the chemistry of 
technetium as well as other muIti-valent elements (c.g., ruthenium, which although 
mostly non-radioactive, will be present in significant amounts). 
Failure to adequately consider the range of o r p i c  compounds present in the tank wastes 
processed in the DBVS tests, and perhaps subsequently in a plant based on DBVS 
technology, can lead to plant inoperability and unanticipated costs. 
Potential Mitigntion: Testing a representative suite of organic cornpounds found in 
waste tanks other than S-103 to determine decomposition products under DBVS 
operating conditions, especially a5 they occur in the vivifier and in the JCVm plenum, 
and evaluate their potential to interfere with normal DBVS operation would mitigate 
these concerns. 
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4, Equipment Design and Specification 
4.1. Systematic Approach 
The DBVS was broken down into its primary systems and a lead appoinled for each 
system. The primary systems are: 
Liquid Waste Feed System 
Solids Handling and Feed to Dryer 
MixerLDryer System 
Vitrification System 
Off-Gas System 
Secondary Wastes 
The approach to the revicw of each system was identical. Each system was broken down 
into sub systems and components for initial analysis. Having been anafytcd at thc sub- 
systedcomponent level they were then reassembled into the major systems and thc 
functionality of each complete systcrn was lhen assessed. 
In addition to analyzing each major system, ERP aIso reviewed the overaIl process and 
pImt design for functionality and did an operability and maintainability review. 
4.2, Liquid Waste Feed Systcms 
The DBVS Liquid Waste Feed System anaIpis comprises SI03 tank retrieval, Solid5 
removal by hydrocyclone, hose-in-hose transfer from the S-109 to the DBVS facility, 
receipt and storage tanks, sampling systems, and recirculating systems. CH2M HILL has 
extensive experience in retrieving and transferring tank farm wastes. Sample analyses of 
the S-109 liquors taken several years ago indicatc there is nothing in the S-109 wastes 
that should cause problems during retrieval and transfer, The waste retrieved will be sent 
through a transfer pit containing a hydracydone which is designed lo remove solids 50 
micron or greater. Thm solids will be rerouted back to S-109. The liquid waste wilt be 
transferred by hose-in-hose transfer line to one of 3 carbon steel waste receipt tanks. 
These tanks are horizontally mounted, cylindrical tanks with an operating capacity of 
approximately 15,000 gallons. The inkt  to these tanks is equipped with a sampling 
system. The waste receipt tanks include a hosc-in-hose recirculation loop which 
discharges to the mixerldryer, this recirculation loop is equipped with a second sampling 
system. The 3 pack design is such that one tank can be feeding, while a second is 
undergoing chemical and radionudide analysis and a third tank is acting as a receiver 
tank for waste from S-109. 
A key feature of the waste receipt system is to ensure that the waste is thoroughly mixed 
prior to feeding the dryer. Mixing of the wastes is accompIished through the 
recirculation pump and a hose-in-hose piping loop. Waste is removed from the tank via a 
nozzle at the lower end of the tank and routed to a return inlet nozzle at the opposite end, 
25 
P a p  35 of 93 of DAOJ589930 
~- .. . .  -~ . ... .. 
RP P-3 13 14 
During this recirculation, up to three sampIes wilI be taken to ensure that the tank is 
mixed. The recirculation Imp is also used to feed the drycr. This allows the tank 
undergoing chernicaYradioIogica1 anafysis to not become agitated. When it becomes the 
feed tank for the dryer it is fed to the dryer without further sampling. 
Area of Concern # 3: The hydrocyclone may not provide adequate separation of ihe 
smaller particlc size solids expected In the S-109 feed 
The current design includes a hydrocyclone for solids scpmtion which is designed to 
remove all fines above 50 microns, It is intended fiat this will be used to meet the DBVS 
feed specification level of 3% max solids. The particle size distribution of the sludges 
shows an average particle size of 10 microns, well below the 50 micron particle remova1 
lever of the hydrocyclone. The concern is that sludge fines will be canied and will settle 
aut in the waste receipt tanks. The operating design is to rctrieve waste from S-109 
above the sludge layer with the intention that sludge fines will not be picked up with the 
waste. However, the defense in depth argument which is part of the safety m e  relies on 
efficient opcration of the solids separation device and clearly the hydrocycIone will not 
perform the required duty. 
Potcntial Mitigation: The ERP recommends that either the technical case bc madc that 
solid fines camat be picked up in S-103 and transferred to DBVS or that the 
hydrocyclone be replaced by a more eficient filter. 
Area of Concern # 4: Given that there is no mechanical agitation in the DBVS feed 
tanks, solids could build up over time (assumes the solidsfliqufd separation step i s  
not adcquatc) 
The waste rccdpt tanks are horizontal (1 5ft long by Sfi diameter) and are not equipped 
with mechanical agitation. The only mixing that may occur r e l k  on agitation as a 
consequence of the recirculation loop. ERF is concerned that there will be “dead spots” 
in the tank, padculdy by the inlet nozzle, this is further exacerbated by thc cyclical 
approach to mixing (Le,, onIy 1 tank out of 3 being mixed at any one time) and the fact 
that waste feed has been standing for several hours without agitation before it is fed to thc 
dryer and the waste is not sampled again before being fd to the dryer. This  would 
probably not be an issue if there were confidence that there was no solids carryover to the 
waste receipt tanks. But 35 this is not so (see issue above) the concern remains for gradual 
solids build up in the waste receipt tanks. 
Potcntial Mitigation: The ERP recommends that solids separation be improved (see 
recommendation against Area of Concern 3 above) such that soIids do not enter the 
receipt tanks andlor the project enhance the waste receipt system design to include 
mixing in the receipt vessels. Also see suggested improvement 2. 
Area of Concern # 5: The epoxy coating on thc waste storage tanks may not provide 
adequate corrosion protection 
The receipt tanks me SA 516 G60 carbon steel, coated with a general purpose epoxy to 
provide 8 corrosion barrier. The information provided by the coating vendor suggests 
that the coating is resistant to materials having a pH vaIue between 2 and 12. The initial 
26 
Page 36 of 93 of DA03589930 
waste feeds will likely have a pH in the I3 to 14 range. If the protective coating faits the 
waste comes in contact with the carbon steel wal1 of the vessel. The composition of the 
waste feed to DBVS will have a nitrate concentration of -5M with free hydroxide around 
0. tM-0.2M at the onset of start-up with associated nitrite concentrations on the order of 
0.1M, However, as waste is retrieved form the tanks the hydroxide levels will drop. The 
waste is outside of the doubleshell tank corrosion specification and could lead to stress 
comsion cracking and pitting in the receipt tanks. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the project validate that this isn’t an 
issue or change the coating requirements to withstand the environment in the vessel. 
Suggested Irnprovcment: The DBVS Project should consider designing separate 
delivery systems for agitation of the tank during characterization, agitation of the 
tank during dryer feeding, and delivery lo the wastc sampler system 
The liquid waste handling sFtem includes a recirculationhaste delivery system which 
scwes three purposes at different times in the operational cycle (Le., agitating the tank 
during characterization, agitating thc tank during dryer feeding, and serving as the waste 
5ampIcr system). Whilc this is a very compact and eflcient design, the problcrn is that it 
can only perform one function at a time. With the unknown duration to mix the tank 
contents and ddays trying to feed the dryer from one tank whilst mixing another tank for 
characterization it is recommended that thc project use separate systems for each 
function. 
Suggested Improvement: The DBVS Project shouId consider a common 
designlsupplier for Ihe two sampler systems 
The liquid feed system has two sampling systems both designed to take samples which 
will: bc analyzed for process control, material accountancy. Although the two samplers 
are located closc to each other and are sampling the same materials they are different 
designs and from two different manufacturers. The project should consider a common 
designlsupplier for these sampIe systems. 
. 4.3. Solids Handling Systems 
Pneumatic transport of solids is utilized in two primary systems within the DBVS 
process: (1) feeds to the meIter/dyer and (2) feeds h m  the melterldryer to the KVW. 
First, soil and glass forming chemicals are transported to and collected in specially 
designed cyclone “impingement tanks.” Soil is mechanically discharged from the storage 
tanks into the mixeddyer system for drying prior to the addition of glass formers. The 
blended, dried solids are periodicdry discharged from the dryer and pneumatically 
transported to the melt box for incorporation into the desired glass product. 
Technical Issue # 6: The soil wI11 not transport PIS currently deslgned 
Soil is delivered via trucks providd with conventional aerated hoppers and a rear- 
mounted blower. The soil will be conveyed pneumatically in dilute phase tmnsport to the 
clean soil impingement tank Iocated atop the dryer. 
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The vendor used a nan-standard design procedure that makes a number of assumptions 
regarding soil density, particle size distribution, and the resultant “’pickup velocity”. The 
vendor procedure does not account for the significant impact that soil moisture and local 
variability of soil properties will have on the ability to transfer material, nor does the 
vendor rcquire or request soil sampling and testing which is typically necessary to 
finalize the design of  pneumatic transfer systems. The various factors used in this 
calcuIation are apparentIy based on the vendor’s judgment, with no reference basis cited. 
nor validation by material testing over the ranges of expected operations, 
Potential Mitigation: Hopper flow tests (either fuIl scale or appmpriatdy scaIed) should 
be conducted with soils of varying moisture content, particle shape factors determined, 
and assure that the vendor’s pcrfonnance C U ~ S  are validated to establish confidence in 
equipment specifications. Bounding limits specified for moisture content and maximum 
sievcd particle size of the soi1 delivered to DBVS me necessary to assure reliable 
opmtion of the feed system. 
Technical Issuc# 7: The soil will bridge in thc hopper and not k d  the drycr 
Each accumulated batch of soiI is anticipated to empty by gravity flow into the dryer 
upon opening the valve at the basc of Ihe impingement tank’s hopper. This was not 
experimentally tested and was based solely on predictive correIations of compaction. This 
asseflion does not take into consideration the significant role hat  moisture content can 
play in causing bridging and will resuh in dimculties in opmtion of a hopper delivery 
system. 
Normally, actual flow tests over a range of moisture contents would bc conducted to 
establish confidence in system design; these were not carried out in this instance. Thc 
lack of real test data and control: of moisture content causes a major concern regarding the 
likelihood of the soil bridging in the feed hopper. 
In addition to the possible difficulty ofdamp soil bridging above the tank discharge 
valve, there exists the potential of pacticlc re-entrainment in the impingement tank’s 
exiting air vortex exists. Normal industry practice is to never allow collected solids to 
accumulate within the body of a cyclone even if the level is predicted to be well below 
the exiting gas’ “natural vortex Iength”. The designed impingement tank does not follow 
the conventional: concepts of a ‘%Iter-receiver“. 
Potential Mltfgation: The ERP recommends that a few simple “bridging ‘‘ and 
minimum conveying velocity tests be conducted as a function of moisture content, as 
well as a scaled filled cyclone re-entrainment observation. 
Technical Issue # 8: Because of the uncertalnty in the particle she, moIstute content, 
etc. of the as-dried material, it is diflicult to evduate the solids feed system design 
In the current design, the dried free-flowing waste discharges by gravity flow into a 
rotary valve and drops into a pneumatic conveying line intended to convey the waste in a 
dense phase manner into batch-accumulating impingement vessels atop the melter. The 
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vendor defined line size and blower specifications for their bid package. The vendor 
based his calculations on the fresh soil with a mean particle diameter of 200 microns (of 
inttrest is that this is a different assumption than that used in the previous soil transport 
calculations). 
Since the pneumatic transfer of solids has 3 significant element of art associated with the 
design ofcomponents, it is essential to work with an experienced vendor. Without proper 
test data, it is difficutt to determine if the dried, blended product can be easily transferred 
or if it wilI be probIernatic. The assumption of dense phase conveying adds significant 
complcxity, particularly in the event of an upset [Le., if the system Ioscs power during 
transfer and the material settles in the pipe it will be virtualIy impossible to re-start as 
designed). 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Project consider specialized 
systems with controlled and regulated gas injection or bypass piperine technology for 
materials that do not have a natural tendency for dense phase conveying. A proper purge 
control system may need to bc designed and tested to avoid pipeline blockages. 
4,4. Mixer/Dryer 
The system reviewed comprised the mixer/drycr; all connected Iiquid and solid fecds 
immediately adjacent to the dryer, including controls; the solids msfer syskrn ns it 
leaves the drycr; off-gas components, including the SMF, condenser, and condensate 
tank; HVAC system for the dryer and condenser boxes; the boiler for the dryer; and the 
chillcr for the condenser, 
CH2M HILL already has the production scale dryer planned for instaIlation in DBVS. It 
was originally purchased for the Transuranic and Mixed Waste (TRUM) packaging 
project and was transferred to DBVS when work on the TRUM project was suspended. 
The dryer has a 10,000 liter capacity and a series of plows powered by a hydraulic drivc. 
The dryer is designed to operate in a batch modc as follows: feed 6,750 Ibs of 5% 
moisture soil from the Hanford site; heat soil to operating temperature of about 140- 
1609; add 1,625 gallons of waste (-5M Na solution , 46% water, 10.8 Iblgal) in small 
batches over an 8 hour period. The target is to maintain a 1-3% moisture content during 
dryer operation which helps to eliminate build up on the dryer walls and keeps the prow 
drive motor power relatively constant. At the end of the 8 hour drying cycle, t ,268 Ibs of 
zircon sand and 582 Ibs of boron oxide are added and the mix is blended for 30 minutes. 
Over the next 8 hours, the mix is then fed throu a pneumatic conveying system to the 
1CVm where it is melted into one of the ICV 2 batches. 
The dryer is housed inside a containment box which is locally cooled. 
from a local boiler and the off-gas system contains a condenser sized to remove the 
excess water (-1 500 Ibsk). 
It is steam heated 
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The mixerldryer is a batch process staged betwecn two continuous processes and as such 
its performance is critical to the DBVS lant throughput. The consistency of the dried 
product and the ability to feed the ICV are again critical (Le., too "wet" and there is a 
danger of agglomeration and jamming in the ICVm fecd system, too dry and there is 
potential for significant dust crcation causing problems in the off-gas system). Thc major 
concms relating to the dryer come from the lack of development data to underpin the 
dryer design and process p m t t m .  All of the full scale tests at Horn Rapids to date 
have used a solid feed, so none of these have any reIcvance to lhe dryer performance. 
There have been snme bench scale testing to estabtish the drying characteristics of the - 
material and therc have been approximately 20 tests done using the 130 liter dryer. 
However, of the 20 tests, only one of them (run 2-2 DBVS, TRPT.OOZ), is relevant to the 
currently proposed method ofdrying and this has been used as the basis Tor tho futl scatc 
dryer design and specification. 
TR1 
Technical Issue # 9: There is considerable unccrhinty with regard to the consistency 
of the dried materia1 and how it will bc controlled 
The current control philosophy is to use the temperature of the solids bed as an indicator 
of the moisture content, and the current specification is to maintain the moisture content 
of the bed ai 34%. Unfortunately test 2-2 did not support this approach since the 
moisture content cyclically varied round the 0.5% level throughout the test while the bcd 
temperature steadily declined from ZOO'F down to 140%. The materia1 consistency 
varies with the moisture content, and in test 2-2 some egg size agglomerates werc found 
in the dried material. If the material i s  too dry it will increase the dust loading in the off- 
gas system, too moist and it wiIl agglommtc in the dryer and bc difficult to discharge 
and transport. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that a solid approach to dryer control be 
considered to ensure that materia1 is successrulIy &ransported and reliable fed to t he  
ICVTM. This is a major issue which needs additional testing and development using the 
13OLsized dryer with S-I 09 liquid feed sirnulant, actual Hanford soil and k c k e r  plows 
to: 
r 
Verify that a product moisture level of between 1 and 3% can be maintained by 
controlling the bed temperature; 
Investigate the potential for operating the dryer in a continuous liquid and solids 
feed and solids discharge mode; 
Verify that the substitution of zircon sand for zirconium dioxide does not 
materiaIIy change the solids product characteristics; 
Generate data for the design and operation of the SMFs and for the vacuum pump 
and condenser, 
Determine the variability of the basic data used in sizing the full scale unit. 
Determine effects of Becker blades and their wear rates. 
Detmine  if large agglomerates will be formed and determine what effect they 
will have on the pneumatic conveying system. 
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Area of Concern # 6: The batch drying time may exceed the specificd %hour 
duration by ils much BS I-lD hours 
Scale up of the results of Test 2-2 indicates that to process a complete batch would 
require 9 5  hours versus the 8 hours in the specification (Le., the dryer is undersized by 
-20%). However, this test resulted in moisture content 0.5% versus the 1-3% specified. 
If a higher moisture content were achieved this should result in a shorter drying time. 
The review team feels that this is achievable and for this reason this is flagged as an area 
of concern, rather than a technical issue, but it needs validating in future tests. 
Potential Mitigation: This will be covered in the tests recommtndcd against Technical 
Issue 3. 
Area of Concern # 7: Temperatures predictcd In the mixeddryer container during 
hot weather may not allow for the proper operation of controls and equipment 
The mixeddryer, hydraulics, and chiller are all contained within a closed containcr. 
While maintaining reasonable (currently specified as 85%) tmperaturs is not too 
important for personnel access due to the expected requirements for limited access, the 
proper opcration of controls and equipment will require limited temperatures. It is 
calculated that in &he summer the temperature inside the container could reach 95*F. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the project decide if ihis is acceptablc 
or if additional cooling needs to be provided, 
Suggested Improvement: The DBVS Project should investigate the optionsl benefits 
of operating the dryer in a continuous mode 
The togic of having a batch process in the middle of what is basically a continuous 
process is not ideal. It i s  recommended that the project investigate the aptionst bencfits 
of operating the dryer in a continuous mode and see how this affects the overall DBVS 
process. 
The projcct may necd to consider alternative design approaches to meet desired 
production rates. To avoid back-mixing of incompletely dried waste, and to increase 
plant production rate, a continuous feed to the dryer should be followed by a 
continuously moving path through the dryer. To achieve an acceptable path length 
requires maximum hcated surface area at as high a surface temperature as admissible, and 
as shallow a layer of agitated soil a5 feasible. One dryer design appears promising. The 
design incorporates heated paddles that Will: increase the available heated surface and the 
rate of heat transfer. 
While no parametric dryer design study has been completed, experience suggests that an 
optimal system would result in specification of two or more small diameter, dual shaft 
dryers operating in parallel, each with an extrmaIly direct find heated wall and provision 
for a gentle through-flow of air to carry off water vapor and reduce its partial pressure 
within the dryer. All paddks wouId be unidirectional thus eIiminating the “kneading” 
action of the present design, which is likely the source of observed “balls” in the waste 
stream for 50mc opcrational modes. The necwsary residence time for complete drying of 
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the waste can be achieved by the designed pitch of the paddlcs and the rotatiom1 spccd of 
thc shaft, with a shallow dope of the drycr from feed cnd to discharge cnd. Two or more 
small dryers operating in parallel afford continuity in pmccssing, albeit at a reduced rate, 
in the event of an inadvertent failure somewhere in the system. Smaller units would 
afford full scale testing before instaliation, and would simplify replacement if ever 
necessary at a later date. 
Suggested Improvement: The DBVS Project should consider mounting the d y e r  
above the mixer in order to simplify the fced systems 
The cmcnt dryer product f a d  to thc mixcr is e x ~ m c l y  complcx and has major issuw 
(see comments in section on solids handling). If the dryer were mounted above the 
mixcr it is felt that the feed systems could bc significantly simplified. 
Suggestcd Improvement: The DBVS Projcct should determine the disposal path lor 
dccontamfnatian soil prior to startup 
The route for disposal of soil u s d  to decontaminate thc dryer before maintenance should 
be ddcrmincd so that an acceptable mcthod for disposal is dcfincd beforc operation 
begins . 
4.5. Mcltcr Systcm and Vitrification l'rocess 
The ICVm container is based on the standard 50 cu. yd. roII-offcontaincr. Within the 
container's mctal shcll, the wall is composed of G in. of refractory sand behind G in. of 
castabk refractory block (CRB). Thc floor is cornpod of an 8-in. layer of refractory 
sand interspcrscd with CRB bricks that support a Iayer oPCRB panels, Two cylindkal 
graphite electrodcs are extcndcd into the container from lid access ports to provide the 
el~ctrical power nccded for converting the dried feed to a vitrcous product. 
To preparc the container for processing, m electrical "starter path" is laid on the bottom 
CRB pancls. The startcr path consists of a conductive graphite-soil mixture to provide a 
conductive electric path between the graphite electrodes once they are installed. The area 
of the container bottom not covered by the graphitdsoil starter path mixture is covcrcd to 
an quivalcnt depth with imn-free gIms frit. 
Tl~c ICVm lid provides fimitcd contaimcnt of thc process gases md f e d  particles from 
the environment, and connections to the fwd and off-gas systcms. A refractory fiber 
blanket gasket provides limited in leakage protection. However, the gasket does not 
provide a leak-tight seal. The ICVM lid remains with the JCVm contahcr aitcr 
processing and is sent as p;ut of the disposal package to the IDF, The lid is not insulated, 
relying on air flow into the plcnum space and the insulating nature of the feed pile to 
avoid excessive warping due to high temperatures. 
Vitrification of the dried waste-soil mixture is bascd on a " b ~ t t ~ m - ~ p "  melting procedure. 
To begin, two batchcs of the drid  feed are discharged into the container. Power is then 
applied to the electrodes causing heat up of the starter path material via joule heating. 
The heat propagates outward and upward eventually melting the adjacent soiVwaste 
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mixture, effkctively establishing an eIcctrically conductive molten mass. Six additional 
dricd soiVwastc batches are subscquently f d  onto the surface OK and evcntudly 
incorporated into, the melt pool. 
As each batch of dried ked mixture is heated, ionic saIts in the waste gcnerally melt 
before any of the oher feed constituents. These salts tend to separate from the rest of the 
feed due to surfacc forces, and float on the melt surface. It has bcen observed that h e  
technetium in the waste preferentially partilions into the molten saIt phase, which upon 
cooling is primarily a sohbIe sodium sdt (sulfate and halides). Thus, in the final DEWS 
product, technetium in the salt phase will be sduble, and avaiiable for release from the 
I C V ~  container in the IDF. 
The project plans to maintain a “cold cap” on top of the molten glass - a  pile of unmelkd 
dricd feed mixture of sufficient thickness to minimize the loss of volsltile spccies and 
hcat, and to kccp the 1CVm container’s plenum space cool. ARcr the final waste ked 
has bccn addcd to the meltcr, a mixture of clcan soi1 and glass formers is addcd. This 
material is intended to assure incorporation of d l  of the waste (including any scparatcd 
salts) in the glass product. 
Particulate, vapor, and gascous species produced by the decomposition and reaction of 
the wastes are carried into the OGTS. The container’s plenum is maintaincd at a slight 
negativo prcssure relative to mbicnt, Howevcr, in tho evcnt of a process upsct, 
prcssurizatition of the plcnum and reIease of contamination and gaseous effluents (e.g., 
NO$ is possible, and has becn obsewcd in largc-scale testing. 
Ancr the ICVm container has cooled suficiently, the lid connections arc unmade and the 
penetrations are scald. Once coolcd, one or more core samples are taken from the 
container for product characierizatian. If these samples conform to the IDF’s 
roquiremcnts, the ICVm containers will then be transferred to the IDF for disposal. 
Tcchnical Issue # 10: Formation of secondary phases is not suiiiciently understood 
for rdiable process contro1 
In the large-scalle tcsting performed by h e  project, both iron mctaI and molten salt phases 
h a w  formed. Both of these phascs can penemte the refractory and threaten the infegrity 
of the ICVm containcr. Technetium pdtions, preferentidly, into boh of these phases. 
Tcchnetium is believed to bc more readily rdexscd h m  the iron phase than from the 
glass. Technetium in the salt phase is soluble, a d  thus dcfiniteIy more rcadily released. 
Molten salts wn also volatilize, and condensc on the rclatively cooler surfaces of the lid. 
In addition to the product implications, the salt can be highly corrosive, and increases the 
p ~ i c u l a t e  burden on the OGTS. 
The project has taken several steps to Iimit the formation of a separate iron phase. As a 
rcsult, the amount obsmed has been reduced from hundreds of pounds of mctal to Iess 
than one. However, since several process changes have been made at the same time, the 
projcct does not know the reIative effeuivencss of any of the changes made. Thus, it will 
be difficult to translate this success into reliabIa process control. 
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The projcct has not demonstrated that it can control the amount of molten salt fomcd. 
Only limited ICVm testing has becn done with a chemically accurate S-109 simulant, 
and none with ohm compositions intcnded for use during DBVS radioactive operations. 
While h e  fiaction of a technetium surrogate incorporated into the glass almost doubled in 
the most recent test (FS-38C), h e  reason for this success - the compositional and 
operational factors that affect the &action of non-vitrified soluble technetium - are not 
complctely understood. Further, this success is refative, since only about three-fourths of 
the technetium surrogate fed to the ICVm was found in the glass. As a result, 
appropriate control measures to ensure the production of compliant products have not yct 
bccn identi Bcd. 
Potcntiat Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Projcct carry out an 
experimental program designed to provide the data needed for process control. This 
would include small-scak experiments to elucidate mechanisms and cxplore potential 
improvements, and larger-scale tests (cngineering and fuIl-scale) to dcvclop definite 
control rncasures and limits and to demonstrate tffcctive and reliable process control. 
I t  shouId be noted that ifonsfourth of the technetium were present in a soluble tom, it is 
not clcar that the containers produced by a production bulk vitrification systcm would 
meet IDF disposal requirements. The cxperimcntal program to develop cantmi measures 
should also look at methods, both physical and chemical, to r e d  the mobility of the 
technetium if present in a sohble form. For exmpIe, fly ash has becn shown to Educe 
the tcchnctium to an insoluble form. Thus, fly ash could ba added to the sand around the 
CRB (or be a part of the aggregate uscd to make the CRB), and thus limit the mobility of 
any soluble technetium not incorporatd into the glass. 
Tcchnical Issue # 11: Failure to close the Tcchnetium mass balance threatens the 
viability of bulk vitrification as ;I supplcmen ta1 treatment technology 
Xn all of thc tests performed to date, a significant fraction (at least 24%) of the technetium 
(or tcchnctium surrogate) fed to the process has not becn accountcd for in product 
analyses. The assumption bcing uscd for IDF pcrfomance modeling i s  that thc 
unaccountcd fraction is present in a soluble form. At this Ievel, while the 50 containers 
produced by h e  DSVS would most likely meet IDF disposal requiremcnts, those 
produced by a production bulk vitrification system most likely would not. This would 
mean h a t  the DBVS would fulfill its objective to dispose of its product in the DF, but it 
would do it in such a way that bulk vitrification would be rendered untenable as a 
supplement to the WTP. 
Potential Mitigation: The project should bctter quantify this unaccountcd for fraction. 
Testing at an cngineering scale with tcchnetium and at full scale with a technetium 
sumgate would both be advisable, given h e  importance of the issue.' Tcst objectives 
should be defined wilh numerical success criteria that are to ba mct prior to DBVS 
radioactive operations, 
' It must also be noted. however, that the assumplion that all of Ihe unaccounled for technetium 
is soluble is technically indefensible. The fact that it is being made, however, Indicates ihe 
importance of achieving better closure on this issue. 
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Area of Concern # 8: The lack of a vdidated approach for control of the ICV”‘ 
process puts the project’s abiIity to proceed to radioactive operations at  risk 
The projcct has not yet been abIe to produce a filled 1CVm container without a major 
process upset (Le., there has not yet been a succcssful demonstration of control of the 
ICVm process). There is no firm basis for determining how to maintain a “cold cap” on 
the melt, nor how thick the cap should be. The project is still determining the optimum 
tempcmture range for operations. There is no monitor for salt fornation, nor for “hot 
ske;lking”- diversion of the flow of electric currcnt to a path more conductive than the 
molten glass. I f  the separate rnoItcn salt phase produces a continuous more eIectricaIly 
conductive path, then the melt will cool, while the salt will be superheated. Process 
controI must be cIearly understood and defined, and its effectiveness demonstrated, in 
order to move through the readiness fwicws prior to initiating DBVS operations. 
Potential Mitigation: The project should complete development of its Process Control 
PIan, and begin tcsting its effectiveness in cnginccring- and fultscale tests iu soon as 
possible. Demonstrating thc effcctivencss of the PCP should bc considcrcd a prcroquisitc 
for ful1-safe system commissioning 
Area of Concern # 9: h feed qualification step is needed as part of the process 
control plan 
The current plan for the DBVS includes significant compositional variation during 
radioactive operations, supported by limited non-radioactive testing. Although h e  
vitrification syslem has been tcstcd most extensively, wen there little testing has bccn 
done with an accurate simulant of S-109, and none with the other compositions that will 
be used. Thus, he project should incIude a f ed  qualification step as part of its process 
control plan for radioactive operalions to ensure that the significant changes in fccd 
composition do not introduce unforescm proccss conditions, nor result in non-compliant 
products. 
Potential Mitigation: The Jccd qualification step should include such activities as 
delemination that the fccd composition is wihin the demonstntcd bounds ofthe process, 
st nowsheet run to identify any potential process problems, thermogravimetric anaIysis to 
avoid problems associated with high temperature phase transformations, and other 
activities needed to ensure safe and reliable production of a compliant product. 
Area of Concern # IO: The lack of prototypic tcsting prevents the projcct from 
predictin futurc compljancc from past succcss 
and pcrfomance, and have met product performance requirements. However, these 
containers have been made from well-mixed powders rather than the process that will be 
used by the DBVS. The dryer and the dried fecd syslem appear to provide several 
opportunities for feed segregation. Dcpending on the required frequency for SMF back- 
pulsing, this might also introduce significant non-uniformity into the melter feed. It has 
been weII-established that non-uniform feeds are more likely to be susceptible to 
formation of second phases (especiatly highIy soluble salt phases) than more 
homogeneous fecds. 
The ICV 4 products produced to date have been rcmmkably uniform in both composition 
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The fecd compositions uscd have also generally been nan-prototypic. Onty limitcd 
testing has been performed using a rcprcsentative simulant of $1 09. None has bcen 
pcrformed using the other compositions that wilt be used during radioactive DBVS 
operations. As a resuIt, it is not possible to project future DBVS suaess fmm the testing 
e h c d  out to date. 
Potential h i  itigation: The project shouId carry out pmtotypic testing at an engineering 
scale or grcater to demonstrate that product requirements can be met with the process that 
will be used by the DBVS. This could be accomplished as part of commissioning. 
However, performing this testing prior to commissioning would allow the project to 
avoid excessive deIays if modifications to the DBVS were noccssa-y. 
Suggestcd Improvements 
Suggcstcd Improvement: The DBVS Projcct should perform additional testing to 
further assess compositional variability. 
The approach and resultant LAW compositions intcndcd to bound the expectcd waste 
compositions for alternative treatment are reasonable as an initial demonstration. 
Additional considerations for future testing nccd to consider the folIowing process and 
composition parameters: 
e 
+ 
Effect of oxidative fcaching in the WTP pretreatment facility. This has been 
noted in the project's pIanning documentation. 
Effcct of cases of low waste loading, e.&, 5 wt.% Na20 on processing conditions 
and grass product. The cmnt  flowshcct does not support the addition of 
additiond alkali as a glass former in contrast to WTP. If  processing these wastes 
will require high-viscosity, high-temperature melts, current Horn Rapids Tat  Site 
work as not assesscd these impacts on productian rate, production stability, and 
product quality. 
Compositional variation due to uncertainty in anaIytical and process 
measurements; couId skew ratio of waste to glass formers +5% or more. 
Effcct of f ed  piIe thickness on pmccss, e.&, meh stability and mte, off-gas 
composition, rctcntion ofTc, I, and organic Destruction Rcmoval Efficiency 
(Dm. 
Effcct of moisture content of feed on process; e.g., pmsure fluctuations, gas 
rclcase, rnclt stability and mte, off-gas composilion, retention ofTc, I, and organic 
DRE. 
Effcct of rccycle on f ed  pmpcrties and process operations. 
Suggcstcd Improvemcnt: The DBVS Project should consider deudoping an 
Uenginecred" rcfractory system to provide better leak-tightness for separate salt 
layers 
This could consist of chemical additives (e.g., fly ash) to inhibit the mobiIity of soluble 
technctium, or of physical changes to the equipment (e.&, rcdesign of the refractory to 
ensure that all joints remain under compression). 
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Suggcsted Improvement: The DBVS Project shouId consider rcdesigning the ICV”‘ 
lid to rcduce Iid warping potential 
Large-scalc test documentation has shown that the ICVm lid is subjcct to warping. The 
lid dcsign must be sufficiently robust so that it can withstand maximum expccicd 
tempmturcs without warping, because warping could compromise the projcct’s ability to 
handle the ICVm container Without spreading contamination. Test report rcsulls indicate 
AMEC may address potential wapage only with a change in the bleed air distribution 
system. ReIiance on effective air distribution, flow rate and temperature may not be 
prudent; the projcct should rccmsider the lid’s design. 
4.6. Off-Gas Treatment Systcm 
The purpose of the OGTS is to,rcmove harmful contaminants in the bulk vitrification 
process gas strcam, prior to release into the atmosphere, and to capture all secondary 
Iiquid eMuents produccd by thc OGTS. The dcsign of thc OGTS is intcndd to scrub, 
condense, lifter, adsorb, chcmically treat, and catalytically reduce both particulatc and 
gascous contaminants and to oxidize CO to COZ. It is the last line ofdefense in 
protecting thc cnvironmmt. 
The OGTS comprises the following wmponcnts which wcrc evaluatcd sintered metal 
fiber filters; wet scrubbcr; high efiiciency particulate air filter; high-efficiency gas 
tlbsorbcr; sclcctive cataIytic reduction unit; OGTS cmcrgcncy by-pass filtcr sysfcm; 
exhaust fans; stack monitoring systcm; and instruments and controls 
The ovcrall OGTS was cvaluatcd, including system operation, flow balancing, and 
interaction of the system components and controIs. 
Technical Issue # 12 - Design criteria for the Off-Gas Trcatment System have not 
been clearly defined 
In a number of meas the design criteria far componmts of the OGTS arc not cIcarly 
defined or differ bctwcen design documcnts and the quipmcnt procuremcnt 
spccifications. Design criteria for equipmcnt must be clcarly estabtshcd for both Normal 
and Upset conditions. The equipment spccifications should cIwrIy dcfinc the Design 
Conditions, Optrating Conditions and all Upset or Emergency conditions to enable the 
cquipment manufacturcr to properly dcsign and test the equipment. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP rccommends that thc D W S  Project improve its design 
and spccifications cuntro1 as rcquired by ASME NQA-1. Where there is uncertainty of 
design criteria, worst case scenarios should be uscd to establish the-comct design 
criteria. 
Technical Issue # 13: Testing requirements in equipment specifications have been 
inadcquatcly dcfiued 
Equipment spccificalions do not include requirements for performance testing of thc 
equipment at critical design conditions. In many cases, manufacturer’s standard tcsting 
was accepted. Examples arc the charcoal filers being procured with a residence time 50% 
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lcss than specified. The organic removal efficiency o'fthe charcod was established bsrscd 
on activity, ralher than retentivity, by the vendor. Both of these issues wit1 be discussed 
undcr the HEGA Skid later in this report. Another example is the Sinter4 McWMetal 
Mesh Filtm Spccification that docs not include requirements for load testing although the 
spccificd dcsign dust load is 7 lbs/hr. This will also be discusscd later under the SMF 
rcport. It should be noted that the SMF manufacturer will not provide a performance 
guarantee 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that testing protocols be included in the 
quipment specifications to establish tho pcrfoxmance cnvelope of thc cquipmcnt. Field 
testing protocols should also be established to define the performance envelope afthe 
OGTS. 
Technical Issue # 14: PotentlalIy Iarge variations in system component pressure 
Iosses and the hystcrcsis within the control system could result in unacceptable 
rcsponsc time to achieve proper flow 
Overall systcm flaw balancing may be difficult, if not impossible, to achievc due to the 
potential for Iarge variations in componcnt and system pressures and the hystemis of h e  
contro1 system. The basic control prcmise for the OGTS is to maintain a constant volume 
with filtcrcd make-up air. This is accomplishcd by adjusting dampers, valves, and/or fan 
s p e d  PotcntialIy large variations in systcrn componcnt pressure losses and the hysteresis 
within h e  control system itself could rcsult in unacceptable response time to achieve 
flow adjustment. This potential must be cmfully evaluatcd to avoid an upset condition. 
The high dcrivativc term in the proporti~n~-integral-deri~ativ~ controller is needed for 
this systcm. 
A cornplcte inslrument and control performance and intcraction evaluation is needed to 
ensurc that controf of the system can be achicved and rnaintaincd. 
Potential Mitigation: Thc ERP recommends that a complete instrurncnt and control 
pcrfoxmance and interaction evduation is cruricd out to ensure that control of the systcm 
can bc achieved and mztintaind. 
Technical Issue # 15: The sintered metaI filters will frequently blind, with a 
significant risk of releasc of contamination 
The purpose oC the SMF is to remove padculate from the off-gas from the ICVm box. 
The design basis is to rcturn the particulates m o v e d  by the SMF to the dryer by vacuum 
transfer, 
The ERP believes that the SMF design is deficient. The metar mesh filtcr is specificd at a 
high cficiency, 99.97% efficiency when challenged wilh 0.3 micrometer particles. This 
is accomplished with twa SMFs in series cach rated at 99.95% to achieve the 99.97% 
efficimcy. This type of filter is not designed for dust loading. The particulate the load in 
process gas stream to the SMF, as defined by the design spccification, is 7 Ibdhr of 
particulate with a rncan partick size distribution of I micrometer, The concern is that the 
SMF will blind very quickly which could potentially pressurize the ICVW containcr and 
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will definitely shut the off-gas system and cause the off-gas to divert to he Emergcncy 
By-Pass Filter System. A pressuro spike above 0.5 psi will rupture t he  Emergency By- 
Pass HEPA filtw, a pressure spike above 1.0 psi will blow the filter out causing a release 
of contaminants to the atmosphere. Objective evidence was not provided to demonstrate 
that the OGTS Control System is capable of preventing this condition. In the event that 
the pressure spike does not vent through the Emergency By-Pass Filter System than a 
pressure spike will be sent back to the ICVm container also causing a releac of 
contaminants. This condition must be corrected for the DBVS to be viable. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP rccommcnds that testing be performed to.demonstrate 
that h e  SMF wiIl not load mare quickly than it can be cleaned. In addition, tcsting must 
be pcrfomed to ensure that there is onIy minimal deterioration in the performance of the 
SMF afkcr repeated cleaning. The Elcaning efficiency must be determincd. The above 
information is also needed to design the vacuum transfer system. 
Also notc that a Performance Guarantee is specifically excluded by the SMF 
manufacturer. The manufacturer statcs “the customerluser will need to validate tho 
suitability of such equipment in their own systcm against a range of actual process & 
environmental operating conditions”. 
The ERP also recommends that he DBVS investigate the potential use of a “roughing” 
filtcr in front of the SMF to rcduce the dust loading This could be achicvcd by replacing 
h e  first SMF with one of a lower efficiency, 
Arca of Concern # 11: Equipment manuhcturers’ standard practice appears to 
have taken preccdcnce over code compIiancc for the Off-Gas Treatment Systcrn 
Equiprncnt specifications do not rcquire full compliance to ASME AG-1 Code on 
Nuclcar Air & Gas Treatment; ASME Standard N509 NucIear Power Plant Air Clcaning 
Units and Components; or M M E  Standard N5 10 Testing of Air Treatment Systems as 
requircd by DBVS Sysrem Specification No, RPP- 17403, Rev 4, Para. 3.3. I .7. A 
fractionalized interpretation of code and standard requiremcnts defeats the intent ofthe 
code. Although thc project’s System Spccification and other design documents require 
compliance to the ASME Codes and Standards, equipment specifications rcquire 
complimcc to only a few sections of the codes and standards. A less than rigorous 
attitude toward codc cornpliancc scems to have bcen adoptcd allowing cquipmmt 
manufacturer’s standard practice to take precedence ovw code requiremcnts, ASME 
Code AG-I provides requircmcnts for the pcrfomance, design, construction, acceptance 
testing, and quality assurance for equipment used as components in nudear facilities. Its 
purpose is to assure that the equipment is acceptable in dl aspects of performance, 
design, construction, and testing. If interprekttion of the code is needed, ASME AG- 1 
Code has provisions to submit written requesls for interpretations. This avoids multiple 
and/or incomct interpretations of the code. DBVS has special requirement beydnd 
commercial nudcar power plants. For that reason the code requires all design criteria to 
be specified by the owner or his dcsignee. 
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ASME Code cannot be fragmented. CH2M HILL‘S approach to code compliance is to go 
haugh the code and trying to dctmine compliance andor applicability on a line-by- 
line basis. There are two weaknesses with this approach; the first is that overal1 code 
requirements are missed (not seeing the forest for the trees). Secondly, the lack of 
compIiance is accepted wilhout sound engineering justification. 
Dcsign, construction, manufacturing, testing, and quality ~ s u r a n c e  rcquiremenls of the 
Code wil1 not be mct without compliance Lo ASME Codes and Standards. In addition, the 
cquipment may not function as required. Compliance to ASME Codes and Standards is 
necessary to provide the high degree of reliability necessary for Government and Public 
acceptance. 
Potential Rlitigation: The ERP m m m e n d s  h a t  the DBVS Project spccifyfdl 
compliance to ASME AG-1 Code to ensure equipment design, manufacturing, quality 
and tcsting requirements are mct. The equipment spccification must clearly define that 
Lhc complcte code and standards apply, including the general requirements, materials, 
design, manufacturing quality assurmcc and design control, as they relate to the 
specified quiprncnt. 
Also note that a Performance Guarantee is specifically excluded by the SMF 
manufacturer. The manufacturer states %e customerluser will need to validatc the 
suitability of such cquipment in their own system against a range of actual process & 
envimnmcn tal operating conditions”. 
Thc ERP also rccommends that the DBVS investigate the potential use of n ‘hughing” 
fiIter in front of the SMF to reducc the dust hading. This could be achieved by replacing 
the first SMF with one of a lowcr efficiency. 
Arca of Concern # 12: The Wet Scrubber spccification does not require 
perfwmancc tcsting to demonstrate the specified removal efficiencies 
Thc purpose of the Wet Scrubber is to remove acid gases, e.g, nitric oxide, from the off- 
gas stream coming h m  the SMF. The off-gas is quenchd with a caustic solution to cool 
it before entering the venture scrubber. Mer the scrubber, cnhincd water is removcd 
from the off-gas by a mist eliminator. An elcctric duct hemr is uscd to rcducc relative 
humidity. Acid gases and entrained moisture must be eliminated so as not to adversely 
affcct thc HEPA Filter or HEGA Adsorber Units. 
The specification does not require performance tcsting to demonstrate the spccified 
removal eficiencies of ninety-seven perccnt (97%) removal of HCI, HF, and SO2 and 
40% rcmovd of N02. The design and sizing calculations provided demonstrate that h e  
Wet scrubber components are sized correctly, Duratek Procurement Specification PS- 
WSS-001, Article 6, indicates Test and Inspection rcquircments are N/A Duratek did 
submit a Wet Scrubber Skid Performance Acceptance Test Plan, Document No. TP- 
WSS-001, Rev. 1. This document, aIthough titled “performance” is an operational Br 
functional test only. Performance is not verified. 
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Potcntial Mitigation: The EEW rccommends that testing protocols be inchdcd in h e  
equipment specifications. Qualification testing will determine the suitability of ihe 
cquipment for the application and esiablish the performance envelope of the Bquipmcnt at 
design, operating and upset conditions. 
Arca QC Concern # 13: Dcsign criteria for the IIEPA fiIters (q., concentration of 
acid gases) have not been established 
The purpose ofthe HEPA Filter Skid is to rcmove pmieulates from the off-gas strcam 
with an eficiency of 99.97% on 0.3 micrometer pmicles. Nominal particle size of 0.3 
micromcter particles has been determined to be the most penetrating particle size for 
systems designed to ASME AG-1 Code. Two fiIter trains are provided, one nonnally 
operating and one on standby. A pneumatically operated isolation valve is providcd at the 
inlet of each unit. Isolation valves to facilitate fib change-out are located downswcam 
of the HEGA Skid. Each filter train includes test section and two HEPA filters in scrics. 
Consideration should be given to utilizing o 90% Amcrican Society oTHeating, 
Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers Filter in front of HEPA filters if 
tstablishcd performance critcria indicate a p i i d a t e  challcnga with a mean diamelcr 
above 0.5 micrometer. 
Design criteria for the HEPA Filters, such as the conccntrationof acid gascs, HF, HCL 
that affect thc filter media, binders, adhcsivedpotting compounds and gaskets, have not 
bccn cstablishcd. The project's rcsponse to qucstions indica14 that standard govcrnmcnt 
furnished cquipment (GFE) would be used. This specific application has design, and 
environmental conditions not ncccssarily covcrcd by standard GFE HEPA filters. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Projcct establish design 
criteria, rcwritc or strengthcn procurcmcnt spccifications, and require appropriate 
pcrfommcc tcsting by thc vendors. 
Area of Concern # 14: Carbon cells for IIEGA filtcrs do not meet the required 
residcnce time as specified Tn the Procurcmcnt Spcdfication and ASRIE AGl Code 
The purpose of the HEGA Adsorbcr Skid is to adsorbhemove organic compounds and 
my residual radioactive iodine. The HEGA Skid has two redundant trains, one normally 
operating and one standby. Each filter train includes test section, a charcoal adsorber and 
a polishing filtcr to prevcnt any carbon particles from canying downstream into the 
Selective Catalytic Reduction Skid. 
Rcmoval eficiency - Carbon cells supplicd by Flanders Corp do not mect the required 
residence time as specified in the Procuremcnt Specification and ASME AG-1 Code. In 
addition, adsorption capacity data h m  vendor is inaccurate andlor misleading. 
Activity values are providcd by the vendor as capacity of the carbon. This is the 
maximum amount of contaminant that is adsorbed on the carbon at specific conditions 
whcn it is at cquilibriurn conditions with the sorbate. In a dynamic systcm, the gas 
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challenge concentration to the bed is q u a l  to the outkt bed concentration. Values are 
typically rcportcd as g n m s  of contminmVt00 gams of charcoal. 
The removal elkiency of charcoal for a spccifxc contaminant (Retentivity) is much less 
Lhan the activity and is an important p m e t c r  because it =presents the design saturation 
limit of the adsorbent for the application. 
The basis of the calculntions is capacity data provided by the vendor. T h e  capacity 
,provided is Activity rather than Retentivity. The actual breakthrough time could be 
within a few hours. Actual adsorption isotherms should bc deveIopcd for the specific 
contaminants at the actual operating conditions, including all criteria notcd above that 
afkct adsorption. The type of impregnatd carbon is a key consideration. Adsorption 
isotherms for the expccted components must be provided. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP rccommends that the DBVS Projcct: 1) establish design 
criteria; 2) perform laboratory-scale testing to validate charcoal adsorbcr (testing should 
indude the possibility of sclcctive desorption and potential chemical interaction of 
contaminants); 3) rcwrite or strengthen procurerncnt specifications; and 4) require 
appropriate pcrlormmce testing by the equipment manufacturers. 
Area of Concern # 15: There cxists a potential for a charcoal fire due to 
conccntratjons of NOx in the IiEGA skid 
This issuo has not bccn adequately addressed even though a fire occurrcd in a similar 
installation at Hanford. (See DBVS-LDS-016 Letters dalcd April 21,2005, & March 24, 
2006 James R. Divine, PhD, ChemMet, Ltd. Chief Engineer). Concerns regarding 
&sorption and patcntial hot spots within the carbon bed arc also detailed in Letter Report 
VSLO5L5290-2, Off-Line DM1200 SIipstrevn Carbon Column Scoping Testing by 
Muck Brandys et el, Vitreous State Laboratory, The CahoIic University of America, 
Washington, D. C. 
Potential 3litigatioa: In addition to the same recommendations listed above for Area of 
Concern # 17, the ERP recommends that the D W S  Project consider multiple carbon beds 
with impregnated charcoal romulated specifically for the gaseous contaminant to be 
rcmovcd. This could result in a step process to remove acid gases, organic compounds, 
etc. 
Area of Concern # 16: The Off-Cas Treatmeat System emergency by-pass fiilter 
system could quickly load with particulate during upset conditions, rcsulting In a 
filtcr failure and rclease of contaminants to the atmospheres 
The purpose of the Off-Gas Emergency Filter System is to provide a path to vent the hat 
gases from h ICVm meft during upset conditions. During upset conditions, the OGTS 
wiIl be isolated and the hot gas will pass through thc OGTS By-Pas System HEPA Filter 
and wntcd directly to h e  stack. The HEPA filter is specified as a standard extendcd gIass 
media filter. 
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During upset conditions, such as blockcd SMF’s, the OGS will divert md go through the 
emergency by-pass system. The particulate load from the ICVm, 7 I b h ,  will quickly 
Ioad the HEPA f i k r  which could cause a filler failure and relcase of contaminants to the 
atmosphere. Another concern is that that the filters in ihe emergency by pass system do 
not appear to have been design& for the corrosive materials that wil1 be in the off-gas, 
giving further cause for concem regarding potential filter failure and rekase to the 
environment. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Project redesign the OGTS 
Emcrgency By-Pass System to handle Abnormal or Upset design conditions. 
4.7.0verall System Design 
Area of Concern # 17: Them sppcars to be little, lf any, design optimization 
During the rcvicw the team found a number of design process issucs which causcd major 
concerns regarding both the functionality of the equipment and the liability of the 
vendors supplying the equiprncnt. They are: 
The use of “hand me down” equipment bought for other projccts is scen as an 
area of conccm. 
Other than work on the rneltcr thcre appears to have been littlc, if any, design 
optimization. 
To date there has becn no operational: research modeling which it is fclt should be 
a kcy too1 to support plant design and opcrational optimization. 
Potential hrltigation: The ERP rccommcnds that thc DBVS Project conduct a design 
optimization study primarily aimed at simplifying the overall design and improving thc 
robustncss ofthc plant functionality and that an operational research model of the DEWS 
systcrn bc constructed and u c d  to support the plant and opcrabifity studies. 
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5. Secondary Waste Treatment System 
The DBVS produces waste streams that are sent cithq to plant-wide treatment and 
disposal facilides not within the DBVS Project, are recycled back into the DBVS, or go 
up a stack. Most liquid waste effluents wilf be sent to the Effluent Treatment Facility 
(ETF). Solid wastcs such as the spent HEPA and HEGA filters are to be sent to 
Hmfobrd’s IDF. An exhaust stack will be provided for release to the environment of 
gaseous wastes. 
Thc waste streams are callcd secondary wastes i d  their management is called Smndary 
Wasle Treatment. Requirements on secondary wastes are that thcir volumcs and masses 
not be so large that thcir disposal is burdensomc either financially or in thcir handling. 
Furthermore, the radioactivity of the secondary wastes must meet formal regulatory 
disposal permitting specifications and treatment faciIity acceptance cntcria. Because no 
bulk wxtc  vitrification tests have been madc lhat include the pmposd flowsheet 
processes that generate s c c o n d q  wastes, the flowsheet infomation 0x1 heir amounts and 
their natms is bascd on reasoned assumptions. If  thcse assumptions are substantialty in 
m r ,  or if in some cases the tank waste fccd compositions are significantIy different 
rrom hose assurncd, the sccondary waste volume, mass and radioactivity estimates may 
be seriousIy in emor. In such cascs acceptable regulatory and/or waste acceptance limits 
on the wastes may be excccdcd, Id ing  to problems in their management. These are the 
issues addressed in the following section. 
Arca of Concern # 18: The scrubber system may not be abIe to treat unexpectedly 
large amounts of gascs and solids, rcsutting io unacceptablc amounts of material 
bcing directed to the ETF 
The off-gas scrubber system may not bc able to treat unexpcctcdly large mounts of gases 
and solids, resulting in unacceptable amounts of material bcing directed to the ETF. 
There is a wet scrubber system in the OGTS hat treats nearly 19 miIIion cubic feet of 
off-gas for cach ICVm box fiIlcd. It is mtici ated h a t  the scrubbcr will be charged with 
reacts with the sodium hydroxide in the scrubber approximateIy twice that mass of 
sodium carbonate will be formod. To kccp the scrubber soIulion from bccoming 
saturated it is necessary to remove a “bleed stream’’ and to replace the volume removed 
with fresh sodium hydroxide solution. This bleed stream goes to the ETF, which is not 
part of the DBVS a d  hmdlcs wastes from many parts o f  the Hanford site. In addition to 
Lhc carbon dioxide, it is anticipated that there will be nearly 4 pounds of sodium 
phosphate and scvcral pounds total of a wide varicty of other soIids. If a larger amount of 
gas and solids than planned for entm the wet scrubbcr system because of excessive air 
flow in the DBVS, or if larger amounts of solids are carried through the system, perhaps 
because afunexpcctd carryover from h e  dryer, then the scrubber system will bc 
chalIengd and unacceptable amounts of material will be dirccted to the ETF. 
2570 pounds o€ carbon dioxide for each ICV R box filled. When this carbon dioxide 
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Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Project rcduce where 
possible the very Iarge volume of air introduced throughout the DBVS, t.g, the off-gas 
makeup air, mdor rcduce the amount of caustic used in the OGTS (ais is related to 
Educing the amount of air used and to the amount of nitrogen dioxide produced in the 
me1 ter), 
Area of Concern # 19: Assumptions about types and amounts of chernicah entering 
the Solid Waste Treatment System 
The flowsheet is largely based on many assumptions about types and mounts of 
chcmical species through the DBVS. Many of these assumptions lead to additional 
assumptions about wha& solid and toxic rnatcrials enter the Solid Waste Treatment 
System (SWTS). For example, toxic nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide gases are 
prescnt and solids from the wet scrubber are introduced In addition, the toxic chemicds 
ammonia and sodium hydroxide itre introduced directly into the SWTS. More and better 
data are needed about the mounts and ultimate fates of kcse materials. 
Potentiat Mitigation: Thc ERP recommends that the D W S  Project examine and 
validatc the assumptions about the materials that are especially toxic and in significant 
mounts and those matcrids that form solids during off-gas neutralization in the wet 
scrubber. 
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6. Operations and Maintenance 
The Operations and Mainfcnance review focuscd on three objective mas to meet the 
review team's oven11 objcctives and focus meas providd in the DBVS ERF chartcr. 
These objective areas were: 
Verify the DBVS facility, system and component design and incorporated ease 
and simplidy of operations, ease and accessibility of maintenance and repair, 
minimization of the generation of secondary waste, faciIitated future 
dcmntamination, decommissioning and disposal and facilitatd testing, inspcction 
and in service surveillmce of safety class systems. 
Evaluatc the feasibility of DBVS operating concepts and maintenance strategy. 
Evaluatc DBVS tcsting, startup and readiness strategies and plms and assess the 
ability of thc DBVS to rcceive operational approval by DOE. 
6,l. Background 
The primary purpose of the DBVS dmonstration is data coIlcction to qualiry h e  bulk 
vitrification waste form and support a decision on implementation of a future production 
scale system. Due to the specialized nature of the equipment and systerns,'and the 
RD&D aspccb of thc projcct, responsibility for operating and maintaining the DBVS 
facility has been as5iped to a subconkactor, AMEC Earth and Environmental, Inc. 
The demonstration will be conducted ovcr a short period of timc, approximately 13 
monlhs to 2 years, and producc up to 50 lCVTM boxes for temporary storage in the 
facility and ultimate disposa1 in the Hmford site IQF. The demonstration is limited to 
400 operating days, nor more than 2 calendar ycars, and 50 I C P  boxes followcd by 
decontamination, decontamination and decommissioning @&D). Individual campaign 
plans are required to be devclopcd by the project and approved by the Washington State 
Department of Ecology for each I C P [  or series of ICVsTM. 
An integntod operating and mtrinknmce cycle for the life of the project has not yet been 
deveIopcd. Operation consists of an eight day operating cycle to produce one box. The 
operating cycle, from waste meipt, feed preparation and delivery to melt, subsequent 
coot down and temporary storagc of one ICVM box is bascd on continuous 24 hour per 
day operations with an operational and support staff of 50 people organized into 5 shifts. 
This staff estimate does not include CHZM HILL personnel required to provide oversight 
functions, or suppoding staff pcrsonnel such as engineering, testing, maintenance, 
managcment, or training support personnel. The project assumes a Total Operating 
Efficiency of 70% to account for unplanned maintenance and operational outages. 
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The current commissioning approach quires  successful completion of a DOE 
Operational Readiness Review afier conducting integtated system cold testing using the 
first 2 of 50 I C F  boxes and only clean soil and sirnutants as fccd. 
6.2. Findings 
No mission critical or technical issucs were identified that would result in the fdIm of 
the DBVS demonstration systcm to mect established DBVS systcm performance 
rcquirements. Specific equipment operability, reliability and maintainability issues that 
the team believes could resuIt in or contribute to a mission critical or technical issue have 
been addressed in the corresponding equipment design scction of the rcport, Thrce areas 
of concern were identified that could result in the nccd for changes in the technical basis 
or equipmtdsystcrn design, or may require additiond tcsting to determine if the design 
is adcquate (now or latcr). 
Arca of Concern # 20: Thc potcntid for future use of the DBVS facility as a single 
line production facility and gap filler capability might not be adequately addressed 
in the existing design 
Thc existing design basis, operating and maintcnance approach and pcrformance criterion 
arc b a s d  on a dcmonstration of short duration (-2 years) followed by D&D. Although 
here is recognized potential bcnefits for the hturc production use of the DBVS facility 
should the demonsbation prove succcssfut, the current design and maintenance stratcgy 
will not support future use without a potentially lengthy shutdown and costIy scrvice life 
extension program to idcntify and accomplish necessary process systcm modifications or 
cquipment rephcernent requiremcnts. Detailed engineering revicw and material 
condition assessments would be required to evduate maintenance, repair, modification or 
rcplaccmcnt actions necessary to extend the sewice life of the facility’s process systcms 
and componcnts to support safc opention beyond the current 2 y a r  service lifc and the 
currcnt 5 year design life. 
Current design of somc DBVS componcnts and systcms such as the waste receipt system 
storage tanks, drycr or dried waste handling system is not optimal Tor future production 
or.longer term use. The practical implications of the effects of implemcnting a minimal 
maintenance philosophy combined with decisions not to cstablish a Refiability, 
Availability, and Maintenance (MM) program or q u i r e  a reliability-ccntercd 
maintcnance (RCM) analysis on component operability, reliability and availability 
incrcascs thc risk that demonstration rcliability and maintainability objectives may not be 
met. As a rcsult, there is  little confidcnce the current strategy will support reliable 
equipment operation beyond the current service I i k  and may not provide the material 
history, operability and maintainability data necessary to support engineering reviews or 
malcrial condition assessmenh in a cost effcctive manner. 
Under the current permit, thc DBVS facility would undergo D&D following cornpIction 
of h e  dcmonstration project, rather than continue operation as a limited single line 
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production facility to vilrify LAW and contribute to risk reduction, cven if he 
dcmonstration provcd successful. This approach using short service and design lives for 
thc facility and its components, systems, and major cquiprncnt appcars to be 
contradictory to the common standard within DOE and Department of Defense (DOD) 
activities conducting nuclear operations that facilities designed to conduct such 
operations should minimize bath the cost of clean up and the generation of waste 
requiring eventual disposal. 
In view of these uncertainties and unknowns regarding the DBVS design and hture 
expectations, a future decision to continue use of the faciIity beyond the initial 
demonstration period, if successful and desirable, may not be possibte on the basis of cost 
alone. While the costs of project actions now to address design issues and devclop a 
camplimentaty reliability based maintenance approach together with establishing data 
quality objectives for the collection ofmaintenance data and material history records are 
real, failure to consider these changes now will limit availablc options in the future. 
Potential Mitigation: Thc ERP rccommcnds that the DBVS Pmjcct consider the 
following actions: 
Rcevaluats the cost effectiveness of establishing increased service and design Iife 
performance rcquircrnents to support future opcrational usc of the facility wichout 
thc nced for scrvice life extension or urrncccssary equipmcnt maintcnance, rcpair, 
modernization or rephcement. 
Establish a graded RAM program, require the subcontractor to conduct a graded 
to RCM analysis and define appropriate data quality objeclivc rcquiremcnis to 
collect ncccssary opmbility and maintainability data to support either a service 
life cxtension program or improvcd life cycle performance data for a production 
faci 1 it y. 
Evaluate conkactual mcthods that will bcttcr cnsure that DBVS complies with 
DOE maintenance mmagemcnt rquiremenls and develop a bcttcr defincd, 
coherent maintenance strategy h a t  supports the immediate demonstration 
objectivw while preserving the option to continue future production use in a more 
cost effcctivc manncr. 
Arca of Concern # 21: An adequate maintenance strategy has not becn developed 
and incorporated into thc dcmonstration facility requirements 
Operations and maintenance rcsponsibilities have becn assigned to a sub-contractor with 
relaf ivcty little experience in operating or maintaining nuclear facilities. Mzthmnce  
strategies and plans have not been fully developed and project documentation contains 
contradictory or inconsistent maintcnance performance rquircments and goals. 
Furthemore, because DBVS is constrained by the existing permit to be a short duration 
demonstration, the project has judged that tho subcontractor is neither requircd to 
establish an overall reliability, availability and maintainability program, nor perform a 
reliability centcrcd maintenance analysis. 
The DOE ordcr governing DOE nudear facility design and construction requires h d  
category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facilities be dcsigncd to faditate inspections, testing, 
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maintenance, repair and rcplacemcnt of safcty stmctures, systems, and c omponents as 
part of a RAM program. Neither the Project Exccution Plan nor thc subcontract 
Statement of Work requires the DBVS subcontractor to perform a RAM or RCM analysis 
because DBVS equipment has Iess than a &year Iife and the short-term operating 
duration ofthe demonstration. The project’s decision to eliminate the requirement for a 
RAM analysis rather than conduct a graded or Iimited RAM program and RCM analysis 
introduces greater uncertainty and risk into the project that the demonstration may not 
meet its dunonstration gods in a safe,  reliable and compliant manner. 
The overall maintcnanca strategy and concepts Lo support safe operation are not well 
defincd or documented in Pmjcct documents. As a rcsult, it is difficuIC to assess or report 
on the fcasibility of the Maintenance Strategy. T h e  minimal maintenance approach 
prescribcd and the heavy reIimce on vendor recommendations for maintenance is likely 
to resuIt in component and ovmI1 system pcrfiomancc reliability and operabiIity not 
meeting expectations, an increased numbcr of operatima1 upscts and subscquent delays 
in mcovcry from off normal conditions, an increase in equipmcnt failurcs and 
corrcsponding ductions in system opcrational avSri1abiIity. The modular approach used 
in fabricating and delivering the major systems and some procurement practices may 
rcsult in non-standard components selection for like functions increasing sparing 
rquiremmts and training and maintenance requirements. 
CHZM HILL has significant nuclcar facility operating and maintenance managcmcnt 
experience and established DOE compliant progamq including a mature Integrated 
Safety Management System. As discusscd in the safety section of h e  report, it is not 
clear how and by what mechanisms tho subcontractor, rcsponsibte for preparing its own 
safety managcmcnt programs for aperating and maintaining the DBVS and mining and 
quafifying not only subcontractor personnel, but CHZM HILL personnel conducting 
DBVS related functions, will bcnefit from CHZM HILL’S experience and expcrtisc in 
nudear facility opmtions, training and maintcnmce. 
Potential Rlitigation: The ERP rccommcnds that the DBVS Project consider the 
following actions: 
4 
0 
W 
Devchp or require the subconkactor to develop and evaluate an inkgrated 
operating and maintcnvlcc cycle plan to b a t  support demonstration objectives. 
Conduct a task analysis using this plan to evaluate the adequacy of cumnt staff 
estimates far project cost and schedule implications. 
Revicw existing Projcct Documentation, strengthen flow down of requircmcnts 
and eliminate contradictions and inconsistencies in Operations, Maintenance and 
Training sections espcciaIly between the project Execution Plan and the Statement 
of Work of the Subcontmct. 
Evaluate existing contract requirements for vendors to conduct component 
performance tcsting under normal operating and design conditions and strengthen 
contract mechanisms to ensure adequate performance testing of procured 
cquipment has been performed. 
Reevaluate the need for and perfom additional lesting to support design and 
performance requircrnents and to better understand and plan for the maintenance 
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that may be required to support reliabIe operations especially as it perlains to the 
dryer and dried waste handling systems. 
Arca of Concern # 22: Readiness requirements for ultimatc hot operations may bc 
underestimated 
The project does not have a well-defined or fully developed commissioning and startup 
slrategy. In addition, readiness requirements for hot operations may be undcrestimatd. 
The project Execution Plan requires a combined readiness effort led by CH2M HILL‘s 
Operational Readiness organization. The subcontract Statement of Work assigning the 
subcontractor responsibility for opmting and maintaining the DBVS facility requires 
them to support CH2M HILL in the conduct of formal readiness prepamtion and rcvitw 
activities using the existing CH2M HILL readiness program. Howevcr, CH2M HILL’s 
existing Opcntional Readinws organization does not have recent (within the past swcral 
years) practical experience in managing, coordinating or leading a comprehensive 
readiness pmgram to achieve the rquiaite readincss for a project of this size and scape, 
Already notcd is the subcontractor’s relative inexperience operating or maiinhning DOE 
nuctcar facilities, and they will have to rccruit, hire, train and qualify most of the rcquircd 
opcrating or maintcnance staff between now and the projected start of operations. Use of 
a subcontractor to opcratc and maintain the facility together wilh the integration of the 
subcontractor and CH2M HILL safety mmagernent programs represents a key projcct 
risk in achieving readiness and project delivery. Formal and periodic strategies and plans 
to achieve the necessary oversight and assure contract compliance beyond delivery of 
initial deliverables have not been developed. 
The currcnt plan to achieve readiness for hot operations (introduction of radioactive or 
mixcd waste into DBVS) relics on just 2 K\FI boxes to perform integrated cold testing 
of the facility and final grooming and balancing of key systems such as thc off-gas 
treatment system. Because there are limited opportunities to establish and assess 
operational proficiency, and conduct of operations and operating practices until the 
integrated test program, developing suficient operator proficiency and assessing 
operational rcadiness of cquiprnent, systems and personnel prior to conducting hot 
operations will be an equally important objective during the integrafed cold test program. 
T h e  review team does not belicve that these readiness objcctives can be fully achieved 
with only 2 boxes. 
Expericnca both within DOE and DOD acctivitics performing radioIogica1 work in 
compkx environments has shown that training and qualifying radiological workers alone 
does not resuh in the requisite proficiency needcd to conduct consistently safe, efficient 
and compliant radiological work. This can only be established lhraugh the fmquent 
conduct of actual work with propcr supervision and through the use of mock-ups. 
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Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommends that the DBVS Projcct pcrform the 
following actions: 
Accelerate Operational Readiness Checklist development and inteptcd readiness 
planning. Add a dcdicatd and graded operational proficiency period into thc 
scheduIe to support achievement of readiness objectives. 
Build a realistic, swlcd Ancillary Waste Transfer Enclosure (AWTE) mock up 
facility based on the final design or retaining and modifying, as necessary, the 
most recent A W E  mock-up built and used to facilitate the current AWTE design 
from ergonomic and accessibility standpoints for future USE in initial training and 
qualification progr;uns and to support developing worker radiological work 
proficiency. 
Evaluate the necd for conducting additional integrated cold testing and the impact 
on thc demonstrations overal1 objcctives and the ability of the integrated tcst plan 
to meet those objectives, if more than 2 boxes are ncedcd to complete the test 
PV. 
Ensure that clcar d e s  and responsibilities arc dpcumented and published soon to 
implement a combincd readiness prognm to start at the earliest opportunity and 
address haw key programs, such as the Cognizant System Engineer P m g m  will: 
bc impIemcntcd and executed, 
. '  
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7. Safety 
The Nuclear Safcty Sub-Team of the DBVS Expert Review Panel (EM) focused its 
review on the ability of thc DBVS Project to meet nuclcar sakty and operational 
stmdards required for a pilot scale nuclear facility. The safety review included specific 
evaluation of the project's implementation of Nuclear Safety, Authorization Basis, and 
Integrated Safety Managemcnt requirements. The Safety Team tailorcd its approach by 
considering the stage of thc projcct and the experience base of the CH2M HILL Tank 
Farms Project with order-compliant Authorization Basis documentation and 
implcmentation of Integrated Safety Management. 
The DBVS Project has completed a significant amount of safety-relatcd analysis as 
evidenced by an approved Pretiminary Documcntcd Safety Analysis (PDSA) developed 
cslrly on in the project and a wcll-structurcd and systematic idcntification of hazards in 
the PrHOA. In addition, a preliminary fire hazards analysis has been performcd, a 
criticalily safety evaluation compkted and an A W  design review of potmtial 
radiation exposures and contamination hazards has been rcccntly updated. Howwcr, 
some of those safety analyses have been ovcrtakcn by other evcnts, because safety- 
accting changes have hkcn place since the design information on which the approvcd 
PDSA was based, For this reason, documentation associated with the PDSA update was 
being prepared in parallcl with this ERP review, 
Operational safcty in Tank Farm Operations is  based on yeam of cxpcrience, and the 
implementing documents are clear, concise and apparently effectivc. Furthermore, the 
Integrated Safety Management (ISM) guiding principles and corn functions are followcd 
at the Tank F m s  and provide a logical framework for CH2M HILL'S Safe Work 
Environment Initiative. While ISM has not bccn implemented at the activity level, the 
DBVS Project Execution Plan implies that the DBVS Project will implement he Tank 
Farms ISM progm. Howcver, significant effort will be necded for the DBVS 
subcontractor to implement a compliant and effective ISM program at the DBVS Project. 
7.1. Findings 
Evaluation of requircrnents for Nuclear Safely, Authorization Basis, and Integrated 
Safety Mmagcmcnt has Id thc Safety Team to develop the overall issues summarized 
below. The detailed bases far the development of each issue arc documentcd in the 
Safety Sccction included in Volume 2 of this report. Volume 2 provides the cornplcte 
rcquiremcnts-based review pcrformcd by the ERP on tho status of DBVS safely. The 
s u m m q  issue dcfinhions presented below were adapted from those used by the rest of 
the review team and are each exprased in terms of the folIowing categories: 
Technical Issues - Issues that coutd potenMIy result in injuries, offsite 
contaminations, long shutdowns, major delays in start-up approval, andlot failed 
readiness assessments, if not addressed. 
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Arcas of Concm - Issues that could result in near misses, onsite contaminations, 
dedine in plant availabilily, Potentia1 Inadequacies in the Safety Analyses, 
positive Urnviewed Safety Questions (USQs), inquiries and questions by 
rcguIators, and dccIines in safety performance indicators, if not addressed. 
Suggcsted Improvements - Issues stemming from inadequate safety 
documentation that could result in polenfid dclays in approval to proceed mdlor 
failure to meet safety performance objectives, if not corrected. 
Tcchnical Issue # 16: Testing and safety analysis have not adequateIy addresscd the 
KVT”  melt bpx performance for containmcat of the melt product, volatile 
radionuclides, and generated NOx 
Projcct testing and safety analysis to date have not yet adcquattcly addressed the ICVW 
melt box performance for containment d t h c  melt product, volatile radionuclides, and 
gcnemtd NOx. The ICVm box is not doubly contained, and dcpends on vacuum 
maintaincd by the Off-Gas Treatment System to contain gaseous rekases. The testing 
experience at Pacific Northwcst National Laboratory and Horn Rapids has b m  
extrcmely vaIuable, and lcsssons lciuned arc being applied. Howevcr, the number of 
unknowns and h e  near failures make it difficult to conservatively bound pofcntial 
midcnt scenarios. A5 a result, the project has a risk of toxic gas or radioactive uptakes 
to opuators and nearby workers, contamination of the work site and extended shutdowns 
of the pilot projcct. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP recommcnds that the DBVS Projcct considcrswerd 
alternative actions that would help rcsolve this issue: 
A risk-rcductionlcost~ptimi~~ion study of doubIsconfainment (e.g., small 
containmcnt building with a safety significant ventilation syslcm) vcrsus single 
containmcnt for the ICVTM box. 
0 A focused effort to reliabbly dctcct hot spots in the melt box and development of 
thc associated recovery plan. 
Dcvclopment of critcria and requirements for mclt termination and restat. 
Install dctectors to monitor NOx gcncration ratcs and pressurization in the ICVW 
box. 
Technical Issue # 17: The safety performance ofthe Dried Waste Transfcr Systcm 
to contain the dricd wastc under normal and accident conditions is not yet fully 
understood and defcnsible 
The safety performance of the DWTS to contain the dricd wastc undcr nomal and 
accident conditions is not yct fully understood and defended The dry waste f e d  system 
contains radioactive Material at Risk in dispcrsiblc forms, and vulnerable areas without 
rcdundant physicat ban-icrs may still exist. As a result, thcre is a potential for 
contaminations and radioactive uptakes by operators and n&y workers. A design that 
does not fuIIy employ redundant physical barriers, i f  not adcquateIy defended, may 
rcceivc resistance by oversight and approval authoritics, resulting in approval delays or 
extensive back-fits. 
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PotcntiaI Mitigation: The E W  recammcnds that the DBVS Projcct consider the 
following actions: 
Prcparation of a DWTS confinement performance justific~~ion a d development 
of a communications strategy with regufaiors and ovcrsight organizations to 
effectiveIy defend the chosen design approach. 
Performance tests to demonstrate the adequacy of DWTS design approach, 
particularly if  any containment components could be viewed as unconvcntional. 
Installation and maintenance of a Safety Significant active, confinement 
ventilation system or leakage d m  system for portions of the DWTS with single 
physica1 boundary containment. (or in conjunction with a melt box containment 
building). 
Technicif Issue # 18: The DBVS Projcct plans to assign operational responsibility to 
a sub-contractor who has IittIe formal nuclear faciIity operating expcrience 
The projckt presently plans to assign operational responsibility to a sub-contractor who 
has intimate knowMgc of the design, but relatively little formal nuclear facility 
operating experience. The DBVS subcontractor runs a Iargely expert-based safety 
program that is based on extcksive experience with simiIar glass melting operations and 
compliant with Occupational Safety and Health Administration industrial safety 
standards. However, the subcontractor does not have significant expcrience in the 
fonnaIity of operations q u i d  to operate a nuclear facility; nor does an ISM program, a 
formality of operations manual, or a mature training program. Success of the DBVS will 
depend as much on safe operations, as meeting waste specifications and operational 
eficicncy goals. Lack of experience in the formality Qf nuclear operations can lead to 
unanticipated safcty non-compliances, a high ratc of occurrences, and potentially, 
accidcnts, 
Potentia1 Mitigation: The ERP recommrmds that the DBVS Projcct flow down a 
rcquircd set of tank farm safety and operational standards to the DBVS subcontractor. 
Bcfore being rclcascd to operate DBVS, t h ~  subcontractor should formally cvaluate 
CH2M HILL initiatives in ISMS, Voluntary Protection Program, Human Pcrformmce, 
Enhmccd Work Planning/Worker InvoIvement, and Safe Work Practices for 
implementation. The m m e r  in which CH2M HILL will execute its oversight and safety 
assurance rcsponsibi1itie.s should be clearly dcscribd in an intwface working docurncnt. 
In addition, CH2M HILL and AMEC should collaborate to develop a 
cornrnissionindstrutup strategy md a deIiberate operations plan that will devclop 
experience prior to introducing radioactive waste to DBVS. 
Technical Issue # 19: Project uncertainty with various portions of the unit 
operations and process chemistry may heighten safety vuInerabiIity undcr abnormal 
conditions 
Project uncertainty with various portions dthe unit opcrations and process chemistry 
may heighten safcty vulnerability under abnomal conditions. This may pose extra 
chaIlcnges to cvent recognition, condition recovery, and cmergcncy preparedness and 
response. For example, the glass melting process couId represent a significant hazard; 
high stored heat energy, toxic NOx, and the potential release of technetium and cesium 
54 
P a p  64 of 93 of DAOJ589930 
suggcst the passibility of a complex, high-hazard accident, Futhcmore, operating 
experience witb solids handling and the off-gas systems for DBVS is insignificant, the 
dry waste transfer system contains nudcar Material at Risk in dispersible forms and 
cesium will IikeIy plate out in the off-gas treatment system. 
Potential Mitigation: The ERP rocommends that the DBVS Prcject consider a 
comprehensive identification of the proccss and chemistry uncertainties that could lead to 
off-normal conditions that wodd warrant unique approaches to cmergcncy prepardness. 
The project should also consider rigorous process and scenario training for operators, 
inchding how to rcact to abnormal conditions, how to divcrt potentid upsets and how to 
handle emergencies. The projcct should develop a deliberate operations preparation pIan 
to accomplish this training and expcrience prior to intraducingradioactive waste to the 
DBVS. 
Area of Concern # 23: tnsufficicat consideration to accumulation of radioactive 
materials throughout the DBVS could had to avoidable radiation exposure during 
operations and extra complexity of the decontamination and decommissioning effort 
The projcct design to date has not given suficicnt consideration to accumulntion of 
radioactive maticrials throughout the DBVS. Consequences could involve avoidable 
radiation exposure during opcrations and extra complexity ofthe decontamination and 
decommissioning effort. 
Potential Rlitigation; Thc ERP rocommends that the DBVS Projcct deveIop a- 
conceptual D&D plan and examine potcntial risks such as accumulations, deposik and 
plate-outs spccific to the DBVS. MatciaIs accumulation assumptions should be 
incorporated into the hazards and safety malyscs rnakxial-at-risk, md also into 
rccommcndations from tho ALARA Analysis Report. 
Area of Concern # 24: The large number of Technical Safety Rcquirerncnt - Icvel 
safcty systems and DSVS - specific administrative controls may be exccssive from 
thc standpoint of human factors and operational complexity 
The ERP cxpresscs concerns regarding the potential impact of the DBVS Safety Systcms 
and Administratha ConhIs on the operability of the plant. The nurnbcr of individually 
designated TSR-Icvcl safety systems, as well as the number of DBVS-specific 
administrative controls may be exccssive from thc standpoint of human factors and 
operational complcxity. A disproportionately large number of TSR-level conwls 
intraduces the potential for causing tcchicaf violation of TSRs, complication of twting 
opcrutions, lack of clear understanding by operators of the relalive importance of the 
individual hazards and asscciatcd conlrols. The growth in administrative conhls 
appcm to be accompanied by a growth in the number of a l m s  that could lead to a 
certain amount of operator comphceney with a lms .  
I 
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Potential Rlitfgation: The ERP recommends consideration of the following actions: - 
Performance of a control optimization excrcisa to examine the origin of each 
TSR-level control; identify tho associated anal ysislevaluation conservatisms; 
d e t m i n e  the sensitivity to the conservatism; and evaluate the necessity of each 
control. 
Examination oPmy design attributes thal are driving the need for a safety control, 
and assess whether there arc reasonable alternatives h a t  would result in simpler 
or fewer controls. 
Evaluation of the frequency and magnitude of swcillmces, readings, recordings 
and adjustmenis in the safety adminishative control programs for viability and 
human factors issues. 
Perform an update of the project Human Factors anaIysis, consistent with the 
latest idcntificd control suite. 
Area of Conccra ## 25: The documented rationale for the revised Hazard 
Categorization is insufllcient 
The documcntcd rationale for the revised Hazard Categorization (HC-3) is not currmtly 
sufiicicnt; issucs revolve mund the mount of radioactive matcrial assumed to be in the 
systcm, the rationale underpinning a ‘worst m e ’  feed composition, and the potential for 
accumulation of releasable materids throughout the systcm. For example, the currcnf 
hazard categorization documentation does not sufficiently defend the assumption that 
three full waste rcceipt tanks bound [he maximum mount of material that can reside in 
thc facility at QIW time. 
Potential Mitigation: Thc ERP rccommends that the DBVS Project consider a rcvision 
to the DBVS Hazard Categorization rcport to bctter describe the basis for the HC 
dctmination. Additional effort should bc cxpcndcd to formulate a robust and defensible 
Matcrial at Risk (MAR) assumption that accounts for (a) assumed characteristics of out- 
of-spec waste, (b} the maximum waste that can be residmt in the facility at any point in 
time without credit for cngheered and administrative controls, and (c) address potential 
accumulation of MAR in he DBVS components. 
Area of Concern #26: Safety docurncntation and analysis does not provide for a 
completc accounting of chemicals used and gencratcd by the DDVS 
The ETP is  concerned that present project documentation implics an incomplete 
consideration of chemical hazards, Some chcmical species used and gcneratcd in the 
DBVS are not quantified or explicitly addressed as part of the accident analysis material- 
at-risk, or as part of worker safety considerations. This observation is consistcnt with 
othcr ERP mas of concern regarding types and amounts of chemical spccies throughout 
the DBVS. Additionally, the documented rationale for determining the inapplicability of 
the Process Safcty Management (PSM) Rule (29 CFR 191 0.1 19) does not appear to be 
consistent with appIicable DOE guidance. 
Potential Mitigation: The project should develop a cornprchensive list of bulk cold and 
generated chemicals, systematically estimate the associated quantitics of each, and 
spcci fy their locations and forms. The results should be used to validate or update the 
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PrHOA and thc PDSA accidcnt analyses. Additionally, the project should use the results 
to compare the quantities ofall the chcmical species to the TQ values used to evahate 
applicability of the PSM Rule. T h a  project should consider a revicw of the 14 elements 
of thc PSM Rule and evaiuatc how application to the DBVS could assist in ensuring 
safcty. 
Suggested Improvement: Thc DBVS Project should consider more explicitIy stating 
its project-specific Safety Objectives in its Project documentation 
Project documentation does not explicitly reflect my clear safety-related objectives for 
the DBVS. T h e  lack of stated goals and objectives could give the impression that safety 
is not a major Projcct priority. Further, without some Ievel ofperformance measures for 
the demonstration, here may not be a well-understood basis for risk reduction and safely 
impmvcment for the full production facility. There may dso be a risk of not meeting 
assumptions madc in the design estimates for worker exposure. 
In ordcr to hctp rcsolve these issucs, Lhc projcct should considcr the issuance of a 
statcmcnt of ovwall radiological, chemical and industrial safcty objectives. The 
objectives should considcr the development of goals and performance mcasurcs for 
radiation exposure, chemical relcasdexposure, and safety incidcnb, Goal development 
should take into account the specific nature of the DBVS process md its hazards 
compwcd to other established Tank Farms and DOE compIex opcratians as bcnchmuks. 
Consideration should also be gvcn to t he  specific identification of uncertainties in 
cstirnation ofworker risk with a plan to conduct tcsts or collect measmcnts in ordcr to 
reduce uncertainty. 
Suggested Improvement: Thc DINS Project shouId consider updating its top-ticr 
documents to ensure consistency in safcty goals, performance mctrics, and 
implcmcnting requircmcnts 
Safcly-relatcd projcct dacumcnts (Projcct Execution Plan [PEP], PrHOA, PDSA) have 
bcen developcd at diffcrent times with varying objectives throughout ihe DBVS Project 
lifetime. As a result, there arc inconsistencies both within and between documents that 
cause confusion w i h  respect to thc intcntions and commitments of CHZM HILL in 
mattm important to the safety basis and safety performance. Also of concern is tba 
c m h n  of additional documents outside thc framework of h e  project documcnt 
structure. These matters couId present difiicdtics and unnecessary complications in the 
development, approval, implementation, and maintcnwct ofthe DBVS safety basis. 
The project should updatc top-tier DBVS documents to ensure consistency in safety 
goals, performance mctrics, and implcmcnting requirements. The O W  should issue a 
statcment of overall radiological and chemical and industrial safety objectives. CHZM 
HILL and AMEC should transfate the safety objectives into realistic goals and 
performance rneilsuccs. The project should develop a clear statcmcnnt of the intcntion and 
implications of the final Hazard Categorization and perform updates to safety-related 
project documentation to UniformIy reflect those intentions. The project should 
implcmcnt document configuration management and appropriate sarct y-reIated review of 
changes. 
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Suggested Improvemtnt: The DBVS Project shouId consider more closely aligning 
its safcty documentation with STD-3009 guldancc and giving greater consideration 
to DBVS as a stand-done faciIity with unique opcrational characteristics 
The DBVS safety documcntation appears too put much reIiance on the existing Tank 
F m s  DSA rather than developing a unique safety analysis. This could have two 
unintcndcd effects: (1) incidents where less information is provided in the DBVS-specific 
safety basis Lhan is indicated in the guidance of DOE-STD-3009, and (2) a potential that 
thc rationale for the derivation of the DBVS-specific safety basis is not always clearly 
explained. Closer alignment with STD-3009 guidance and greater consideration of the 
DBVS as a stand-alone EaciUty with unique operational chamctcristics will produce a 
more understandable and comprehensive safety basis. . 
Consideration should be given to the deveiopment of bounding and representative 
accidcnts using thc hazardous conditions idcntified and binnd in the DBVS PrHOA. 
Consideration could be givcn to cithcc the preparation of simple scoping cdculations 
more tdorcd to the configuration and conditions of the DBVS, or a more comprehensive 
discussion ofwhy the Tank Farms analysis is applicable to the DBVS. Consideration 
should also be givcn to the identification of a set of operational modes (as wcfl as 
mticipatcd abnormal conditions and thcir recovery), followed by a process to vcrify that 
thc selected controls are applicable and suffcicnt. 
Suggested Improvement: The DBVS Project should strcngthcu the presentation of 
its commitment to ALARA impIementation in top tier project documeats 
The DBVS Projcct has performed a solid review of the design-to-date, documenled in the 
ALARA analysis (RFP-23 1 13, Revision 5); howevcr, some top-level project 
documentation (eg., RPP-17403 and RPP-17807) does not adequately reflcct h e  
pmjcct’s commitment to ALAR4 implmentrrtion. The CH2M HILL’S PEP discusses 
A L A U  only in tbc contcxt of radiological exposure. The CH2M HILL R&ologicd 
Control organization has the only explicitly defined responsibility for ALARA; design 
agent responsibilities are stated briefly and generally, The A m - r e l a t c d  infomation in 
the PEP and the DBVS Systcm Spccifications is very brief and of less detail than that 
associatcd with othcr cnginccring standds. These descriptions and depictions imply a 
limited emphasis on ALARA in design - both in terms of tho hazards considered and in 
terms oE the roles and responsibilities across the project tu implcment ALARA principles. 
Thc text of the top tier Pmjcct documentation should bc modified to accurately reflect the 
pmjcct’s commitment to ALAEM as well ils the other aspects of safety in design and 
operations. 
I 
58 
Page 68 of 93 of DA03989930 
RPP-313 14 
8. Conclusions 
The Expert Revicw Panel completed a detaild evaluation of the technical basis of the 
DBVS system design. Details of he evaluation are discussed below and in the detailed 
sub-team reports included in RPP-3 1337. At a summary level, the t e r n  directly 
addressed the primary questions posed by the ERP chater, nmcly, 
Arc therc any flaws in the current dcsim or operational dans that would prevent the 
DBVS system from meetinp safety or technology demonstration obiectives? 
No fatal flaws wcre found. Howevcr, the DBVS, as currently stmctwd, may not 
meet two of fivc mission objcctivcs: 
Galher pilot plant operability data 
0 Develop the overall life cycle system perfonnance of bulk vilrification and 
produce a comparison o€thc bulk vitrification process to building a second 
LAW Immobilization facility or othcr supplemental treatment altcmatives as 
providod in M-62-08. 
To meet these objectivcs the projcct must expediliously devefop plans to achieve 
the last two and dcvelop clear succcss criteria to determine whether they have 
been mct. 
Additionally, here are tcchnical issues that, if not satisfactorily resolvcd, could 
signi ficmtly affcct thc project’s ability to mcct its ovcrall mission as stated in the 
project JMN document. 
Will the DDVS svstem mcct minimum product quality and demonstration nroduction 
rate requircmcnts? 
Although tcsting to dato indicates that the DBVS systcm produccs a product h a t  
mccts all product quality rcquirements, this testing has not bccn prototypic. 
Furthermore, productivity will be improved by reducing h e  complexity in the 
DBVS systems and implementing an effective nuclear safety managcment 
progm. 
In addition, mixer-drycr, off-gas system, and integrated syslem testing and 
evaluation must be comp1eted before the production rate can be reliably 
estimated. 
Is the tcchnical basis of the DBVS flow sheet sound? 
A detailed projcct flowsheet has becn developed which is an important source of 
dcsign information. However, much of the flowshcct information is based on 
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unvcrificd assumptions. Fmuscd development effats  to vdidate key flowshcet 
assumptions are necessary. 
Is the DBVS Equipmcnt and Facilitv desim basis ndcquate to bound the construction 
and oncrating costs  for the demonstration? 
Modifications to the design and additional vendor testing over a wider range of 
operating and upset conditions are necessary, Lack ofproject expu-imct w i h  dry 
wasfc handling, mixeddyer, and off-gas treatment systems make it difficult to 
bound operating costs. With respect to construction costs, no additional proccss 
steps wcre idcntifd as being necessary, 
What are the prirnarv outstandinp safcty and technical riskslunccrtainties for the 
DBVS? 
Potential safety issues, including the confinmen! strategy, implementation of an 
effcctivt ISM program, and preparation for response to off-normal events, will 
nccd to be addresscd to safefy exccuute thc DBVS Project. 
The primary technical risks are assodated with thc forms of technetium, the 
compkxity of the proccss, flow of dry waste feed, the ability tu control the drying 
process, prevention of secondary phascs in the melt box, balancing of tha oITgas 
systems, and the performmcc of the Sintcred Mctal/Mesh Filkrs. 
In conclusion, bulk vitrification is a technology that rcquires further development and 
evaluation to fully determinc its potential for meeting the Hanford waste stabilization 
mission, The key focus of the project should bc on adquately cstimating the Iife-cycIe 
cost and risks of the bulk vitrification process for cornparkon With othcr altcrnativcs by 
DOE. The prajcct must dcfine the compositional and process operating range ovcr 
which the tcchobgy can be expected to bc successful. 
No issues that would jcopdize the overall DBVS mission were found. Howcvcr, there 
are technical issucs that, if lefi unmitigated, could result in failure to meet project 
objectives. In addition, Lhcre are a numbcr of areas of concern that need technical and 
managcrnent attention. We believe that it is important h a t  the issues identificd by this 
rcview be addressed in thc near twm. 
The team acknowledges that the DBVS Project tcam has already initiated scvenl actions 
to address h e  issucs identified by the EM. In [he future, the project should conduct 
technical reviews at key decision points to assure that these issues and others that may 
arise are idcntificd and resolved in a timcly manner. 
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CH2M HILL Hmford Group Inc. (CH2M HILL) is conducting an external review of the 
Demonstdon Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) to assure that the technical basis for 
the dcrnonstmtion facility design is adequate to meet the objcclives of the DBVS project, 
as stated in the Project’s Systcm Specification RPP-17403. The primary purpose of  this 
review is to assist the DBVS project in the finalization of a defensibIe technical basis and 
identification of risks and uncertainties associated with the Project’s p l m c d  technica1 
approach. The DBVS project must have a cradibIe cost  and schedule to proceed into 
construction and opmtion. This can only be achieved with a sound technical basis for 
the system design, 
The DBVS rcview scope invoIvcs formation, coordination, and performance of a DBVS 
Expert Review Panel (ERP), whose objective is to revicw select4 aspects of the DBVS 
project and provide recommendations to the CH2M HILL project t c m  that will enhance 
the likelihood of overall DBVS projcct succcss. 
The review t c m  shall focus thcir evaluatlion on thc effectivencss of the DBVS design as 
delincd in thc rcfcrcnce and supporting documents that will bc providcd to the tern. The 
objective of thc review is to validate that the DBVS system, as dcsigncd, mcets the 
requirements defincd in the system specification, is expcctcd to produce a waste product 
that mccts Intcgratcd Disposal Facility (IDF) disposal requirements, and can be expcctcd 
to rcceive operational approval by DOE authorities. To this end thc ERP work shalt 
focus on: 
Idcntifying flaws in the design or operational plans that would prevent the DBVS system 
from mccting tccbnotogy demonstration objectives 
Determining if DBVS is expected to meet product quality and production rate 
requirements 
Evaluating the tcchnical soundness of the DBVS flowshect 
Determining i f  the DBVS equipment and facility design basis is of sufficient detail to 
adcquatcIy bound the construction and operating costs 
Identifying DBVS technical risks or uncertainties 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The review will rocus on thcse five primary technical subjoct areas: 
0 Mission Cnfemtion - This subject m a  review is intcnded to focus on the overall 
intcgration of the DBVS project into the Hanford Site’s mission supporting tank 
waste treatmcnt. This part of the review scope is intended to focus on h e  
flowdown of mission performance rcquiremmts that the DBVS project has been 
taskcd to demonstrate, 
Flowsheet -This subject area review is intended to focus on the DBVS overall 
flowsheet. This review shall bc limited to those systcms that are specific to the 
internal boundaries of the DBVS project, and is not intended to include secondary 
support systems such as effluent trcatment or utility supply. The need to extend 
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the review to my of the secondary support systems will be evaluated on an 
individual basis as the need arises. 
Vitrification Svstem - This subject m a  review is intcndcd to focus an the design 
of the vitrification system, and shall include specific evaluations of the following 
mas: 
o Testing and Scale-up Program 
o Waste Package and Glass Recipe Formulation 
o Refactory and Container Design 
Primm Supporting Equipment -This subject area revicw is intcndcd to focus on 
the design of the major supporting equipment needed to ensure functionality of 
the vitrification system, and shall include specific evaluation of the following 
areas: 
o Fccd Mixcr and Dryer Equipment 
o Off Gas Trcatment Equipment 
Nuclear Safctv and Operations -This  subject arca review is intendcd to focus on 
the ability of the systmn to mcct nuclcar saficty and operational standards rcquircd 
for a RCRA permitted research and development pilot scale facilily. This review 
shall includc specific cvaluation of the following meas: 
o Nuclear Safety and Authorization Basis Rcquiremcnts 
o Operations and Maintenance Feasibility 
MEhlI3ERSIIIP 
Thc ERP shall consist of thc five Rcview Subjcct Leads and a numbcr of Subject Matter 
Experts, as dcemcd appropriatte by the CH2M HILL Projcct Lead. One of the Review 
Subjcct Leads will be designated by the CHZM HILL Project Lead as thc ERP L a d  and 
shall be rcsponsible for coordinating and communicating the efforts of dl ERP members. 
Thc t e r n  mcmbcrs will be indcpendcnt ofthc cwent DBVS project, have a national 
rcpubtion and cxpcricnce, with appropriatc academic, tcchnical, or real-wortd 
management backgrounds. CH2MHILL will identify appropriate candidates for the 
various positions within h e  ERP wilh concurrence of ORP and EM Project Recovery. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
CH2M HILL Revierv Manager 
The review manager is responsible for identifying and sclecting the expert panel, 
organizing tcchnical presentations, and providing h e  documentation that is the subject of 
the review, The review mmnagccr is rcsponsible for the overall working schedule, 
arranging for onsite and offsite mectings, facility m g e m e n t s  for the team while onsile, 
progress reporting, and issue resolution. The review manager will mist the team with 
the preparation and review of the intcrim and final repo~tq and will facilitak the 
resdutian of any technical disagrcments bctwccn team leaders andor membcrship. 
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The rcvicw manager will assure that DOE, Ecology, and DNFSB representatives arc 
notifid of kcy mcctings and summary progrcss reports, 
CIItRI IIlLL DDVS PraJcct Manager 
The DBVS Project Manager is the primary customer for this external review. He is 
responsible to work with the Review Manager to assure that current project information 
is made available to the ERP, and that key members of the project technicat staff (CH2M 
HILL and subcontractors) are made available for reasonable interaction wilh the various 
teams so that technical information, questions, and clarification can be achieved 
cficicntly. 
Oflicc of River Protection 
ORP shall rcview and concur wilh the ERP mcrnber seleclion and facilitatc DOE Ofice 
of Environmental Management (EM) concurrcnce, as necessary* O W  wiIl phcipate as 
a an obscrver during the various meetings and progress reporting, will review the intcrim 
and h a 1  rcports, and will providc commcnts to the CH2M HILL Projcct Managcr in a 
timely fashion. 
EM Office of Project Recovery 
EM Of3ice of Projcct Rccovcry shall revicw and concur with the ERP membcr seIcction 
in a timely fashion. Projcct Rccovcry staffmay participate as an obscrvcr in the various 
mectings and progress reports. Project Rccovcry wiIl assure ncccssary communication 
with other EM entilies that have an inkcst  in the progress and outcome of this review, 
and will m g e  for any ncccssary EM briefings or mcctings that may be required. 
Ertcrnal Revicw Panel 
The panel is primarily responsible to dcvdop a reasisonable revicw schedule, identify 
nccdcd information, conduct a professional review, resolve internal technical: diffcrcnccs 
of opinion, organize the final rcport, m l v c  comments on report drafts, and produce a 
high quality review report. The pane! reports to the CH2M HILL review manager, who 
will work to facilitate the efforts of the team, and will be the final authority to resolva 
issues of review scope, conflicts with the DBVS project resources; and internal and 
external schcdulc conflicts. 
PERIOD OF PERFOttMhh'CE 
The ERP work is cxpected to bcgh in May 2006 and be completed bcforc the end of 
Sepkmbm 200G. Thc ERP reviews shall include a combination ofHanford Site 
interviews and information gathering sessions, and independent document rcviews that 
may take place at locations convcnicnt to h e  individual reviewer and associated review 
subject team, The primary delivcrable for h i s  work will be a final report of ERP review 
activitics and recommendations delivered no latcr than September 29,2006. The review 
team is expcctcd to work with the CH2M HILL project lead to conduct a review of the 
draA product wilh an identified review l e a ,  work to resolve comments, and produce the 
final document, 
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Signature on file 
Roy Schcpcns, Manager 
Office of River Protection 
Signature on file 
Mark Spears, Prcsidcnt 
CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc. 
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Dr. Chris Burrows 
Senior Vice President 
TechnoIogy & Enginecring 
Energy Solutions 
Dr Burrows has almost 40 y e m  of engineering and managcment cxperience in a wide 
range of fields, including aeronautical and nuclear engineering. He has broad experience 
in both nuclear fuel and waste management, and has managed major capita1 programs in 
both of thesc areas. In addition to his experience in gcneral and project managemcnt, Dr 
Bumws has led significant tcchnical and engineering teams and held senior positions in 
both strategic devclopmcnt and quality assurance. Dr Burrows’ formal quaIifications are 
in Mcchanicaf Enginecrhg, but over the last 15 years his skills have devdoped more into 
General and Project Managemcnt. Dr. Burrows expmknce indudes working in both the 
UK and Europe and has spent h e  last 7 years working in the USA. 
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Dr. William Ibbs 
Scnior ConsultantlProfessor 
University of CaliCornidBerkelcy 
Dr. Ibbs has extensive international & domcstic consulting experience in construction 
labor productivity issues; schcdufa disruption, delay & acceleration; injuries; projcct 
planning & control systems; and standard of care. Dr. Ibbs assignments have been 
throughout tho Pacific Rim, Middle Easf, Europe and U.S. His industry experience 
invohes engined'ng-constructian, tochnohgy, petrochemical, military, heaIthcare, 
manufacturing, & education projccts. Dr. bbbs has authored 170+ papers in scholarly 
journals, books, and magazines and has extensive trial, arbitrarion, and mediation 
expcrience. 
0.2 
P a p  78 of 93 of DAOJ589930 
Doughs Johnson 
Scnior Program Manager 
Mr. Johnson has 30 y e q  of profcssional experience including eighteen months providing 
corporate management, operational rcadincss, and tahnicd advisory support to a number 
of BWXT managcd activities and DOE Category 11 nuclear facilities. He has 28 years 
providing successful leadership and sound management in the US. Navy’s nucIear 
submarine force. Mr. Johnson’s experience includes 15 years of senior and executive 
level management of submarine technology, weapons, and nuclear propulsion programs. 
He has achieved excellcnt standards of performance managing all aspects of rcactor. 
safeguards, maintenance and modernization, opcrational readiness, and training and 
certification pmgnms. 
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Dr. Steve Krahn 
Senior Technical Dixcctor 
Perot Systems Government Services 
Dr. &ahn has 28 years of general, technical project management and engineering 
experience in positions of increasing responsibility in government, private industry, and 
the military. His technical and project management highlights include: technical 
leadership of safcty oversight Tor an independent federal agency; chairing indepcndent 
safety review boards for two major Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and an NRC 
regulated plant. He has chaired the Tank F w  Senior Safety Review Board, providing 
' nuclear safety oversight for the Tank F m  at the Hanford Site since July 2001; chaired 
the independent Criticality Safety Committee advising BNFL Inc at Oak Ridge from 
December 2002 to June 2005; was namcd to Iead thc Independent Review Team, 
providing nuclear work rnanagcment reviews, within the Nuclear Materials Tcchnology 
Division at thc h s  Alamos National Laboratory in November 2003 and ChJrs the 
Indcpcndcnt Rcvicw Board for the Mctmpolis Tcchnical Works, an NRC-rcgulatcd fucl 
fabrication facility. 
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Dr. Edward Lahoda 
Consulting Engineer 
Westinghouse 
Dr. Lahoda has consulted in chemical processing for Westinghouse Science and 
Tcchnology, Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels Division, DOE at West Valley, Savannah 
Rivcr, ITP, Hanfobrd, and Fmafd. He is a mcmber of the National Academy of Sciences 
review panel for HLW processing at Idaha and in the DOE complex. Dr. Lahoda 
managed, developed, d e s i p d ,  implemented, and provided field support for the 
Wcstinghouse Soil Washing and High Temperature "hemal Desorption processes for 
contaminated soils; developed, testcd, designed, and supported implementation of 
waterglass treatment techndogy for cleaning process watct and ground watcr 
rcmcdiation; and designed and managed the construction, permitting, and equipping of 
tbc Environmcntal Technologies Tcsting Laboratory uscd for bench scak testing of soil 
rcmcdiation processes and water cleaning. 
. 
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Dr. John R Longcnecker 
Prcsiden t 
Longencckcr & Associatcs, 1nc 
Dr. Longcnecker has over 30 years experience in the energy industry in the areas of 
project management, strategic planning, regulatory compliance, independent assessment, 
and quality assw;~nce in various programs including environmental remediation, national 
defense, nudear reactor development and operations, waste management, and advanced 
technology deveIopment and deployment. Mr. Longenecker’s experience with DOE 
programs includc serving on review and advisory panels at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Yucca Mountain Project, 
FIuor Hmford, the Hanford Tank Farms, and the Office of River Protection. His dutics 
include performing management assessments for many DOE projects, and programs 
including.lhe Yucca Mountain High Level Waste Projcct, the Idaho Spent Fuel Project, 
and the Lawrcnce Bcrkelcy National Laboratory. In 2000, Mr. hngenecker and several 
Longcncckcr & hssociatcs staff scrvcd as mcmbers of a DOE rcvicw of the TWRS 
project that was mandatcd by Congress. Mr. Longenecker also serves as Managing 
Director and Working Group Coordinator of the U.S. Deparhnent of Energy’s Encrgy 
Facility Contractors Group. 
B.6 
P a p  82 of 93 of DA03589950 
. - -. . . . . . .  
RPP-31314 
Dr. Robcrt Bruce Matthcws 
ConsuItrnt 
Dr. Matthews has 30 ycm of scientific and cngineering experience in nuclear 
technologies wilh a primary focus on special nuclear mattrials, nuclear reactar fuels, and 
nuclear facility operations. He spent eight years as a Research Scientist at Atomic 
Energy of Canada where he developed advanced nuclear fueIs and structural materiaIs for 
the C N U  reactor. He subsequently spent two yeus as a Research Scientist at Pacific 
Northwest Labs working on proliferation resistant fuels for advanced nudear power 
sysrems, Dr. Matthews has worked as a Iino and program manager at Los Almos 
National Laboratory since 1980, and has been involved in Department of Energy 
programs in stockpite stewardship, nuclear materials disposition, environmental 
rnulagcmcnt, and space and terrestrial nuclear power systems. He was Director of the 
Nuclear Materids TechnoIogy Division from 1993 to 1999 and was responsible for the 
TA-55 Plutonium Facility and the Chemise  Metallurgy Research Building- He has 
dircct cxpericncc in nuclcu f d i t i e s  managcment incIuding operations, constnrction, 
regulatory compliance, integrated safcty managcment, and safeguards and sccurity. Dr. 
Matthcws is [he author or co-author of over cighty journal publications, conference 
procccdings, and tcchnical reports. He initiated the international Plutonium Futures 
Conference and is a Fcllow of the American Nuclear Socicty. 
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Dr. Arum S. Mujnmdar 
National. Univers€ty of Singapore 
Dr. Mujumdar has experience in hdus~ial R&D in the United States, as well as post- 
doctoral R&D experience in an i n d b a l  research institute in Canada. Aside h m  
providing training and professional development comes to many industrial organizations 
in several couutries, Dr. Mujmdar has provided technical c o d t a t i o n  in various aspects 
of drying and heat tramfa problems to a plethora of companies. He received the first 
IDS award for Innovation in 1986 for his work on superheated steam drying of paper and 
then in 1998 his excellent research contributions were recognkd via the prestigious 
Pmta and Gamble Award. 
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Dr. Ian L. Pegg 
Catholic University of America 
Dr. Pegg is the Associate Director of the Vitreous State Laboratory at The Catholic 
University of Ame&a (CUA). His research interests include the mterials science afld 
structure of glasses, optimization of glms compositions for we in nuclear waste disposal, 
leaching mechanisms and the chemical dumbility of glasses, high-temperature properties 
of glass melts, and high-tcznpemure mterials interactions with glass melts, as well as the 
fundamemtal statistical thennodynamia ofthe bulk and interfacial properties of multi- 
CofllPoneLlt fluid mixtures. Dr. Pegg has directed nummus waste vitrification studies 
involving the development aud c h a m t a t i o n  of glass formulations and the 
dcmomlration and scale-up of Jouleheated melting processes. Be was the prixlcipal 
Investigator for the vitrification development program that mppwted the Duratek, hc. 
M-Area facility, the world’s largest jouleheated radioactive production meIter. 
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Joseph M. Perez, Jr 
Advisory Engineer 
Washington Group International 
Mr. Perez joined Washington Group International in 2001 as an Advisory Engineer in the 
Research and Technology Group of the Hanfd  Waste T-at Plant. His iaitial 
assignment was team lead for the R&T HLW and LAW vitrification flowsheet testing 
activities. In 2005 be also assumed responsibility for waste farm testing, modeling and 
product qualification work scopes. Responsibilities included managing team member 
assignments and performance and pmvidmg technical oversight and management of 
subcontractor vitrification and laboratory testing activities (dew work scope, 
witnessing testing activities, reviewing and accepting technical deIivembles, and 
monitoring of schedule and budget performance) and integrating research results into 
engineering and process qerations functions. Mr. Perez was also the Principal 
Investigator for several DOE Tank Focus Area tasks. Thwe include vitrification tcstiag 
and assessmmt of the N E L  HLW flowsheeb, melter and waste form technology 
assessments, and evaluation of RusSian ad French induction heating vitrification 
tedmology* 
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Dr. R l .  John Ptodinec 
Senior Advisory Consultant 
Savannah River National Laboratory 
Dr. M. I. Plodincc is a Senior Advisory Consultant with thc Savannah River National 
Laboratory, currently acting as Science Advisor. In this role, he is the lab’s “Science 
Guardian,” and responsibIe for fostering strategic university partnerships. Dr. Plodinec 
rccently rcturncd to SRNL after eight years at Mississippi State University. 
Dr. Plodinec is an internationally recognized expert in nuclear waste characterization, 
vitrification, and disposition. During his 22 year invdvement with the Dcppartment of 
Energy’s Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) -the United States’ first and the 
free world’s largcst radioactive waste vitrification fxitity - Dr. Plodincc had an impact 
on every aspect of the DWPF process, including charactcrization of h e  waste, materials 
tcsting and performance evaluation, and proof testing of the canister closure to ensurc 
Icaktightncss. Dr. Plodincc was also the primary tocbnical Iead for the DWPF product 
qualification program. Hc rnanagcd the $40 million doIlar DWPF product qualification 
progrm within SRNL. In this latter role, Dr. Plodinec had rcsponsibilily for achieving 
Mncumnce h m  the regulatory community, and acccptmce by the public. 
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Richard D. Porco 
Vice President, Power and Thermal Products 
ElIis Sr Watts Intcrnational 
Mr. Porco has over thirty-five years experience in thc engineering, design, and 
development of HVAC products and systems for nuclear, military, and environmental 
facilities throughout the world. He was a membcr of the industry response team at Three 
Mile Island. He is also President of RDP Consulting Services, providing design, 
fabrication, and problem-solving expertise for high efficiency filtration, carbon 
adsorption, and contaminant control systems. 
Mr. Porco is Vice Chainnan of the Amcrican Society of Mechanical Engincm Board on 
Nuclear Codes and Standards (BNCS) and Chairman of the Committee on Board 
Operations. He is Past Chair of the ASME Main Committee on Nuclear Air and Gas 
Treatment (ASME Code AG-1). He is a past Prcsidcnt olthe JntmatianaI Society of 
Nuclcar Air Trcatment Technologics {ISNATT). 
Mr. Porco is a conlributing author of the DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook, DOE- 
HDBK-1169-ZOO3. He scwcs on Tcchnical Revicw Panels for the Institute For 
Regulatory Science evaluating technology such as “Alrtrnate Metallic High Efficiency 
Particulate Air Filtration Systcms” and *‘Alternative Ceramic High Eficieney Particulate 
Air FiItratim Systems”. 
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Dr. Eric Tchernitclieff 
Director of Technology 
AREVA NC Inc. Richland Office 
Dr. Tchcmikheff is a senior technical manager with 26 plus years of experience in 
nuclear engineering. His ficus is on radioacctivc waste management and msfemng 
French tcchnology to U.S. facilities, DL Tchemitcheff has indcpth expertise in all 
aspects of radioactive waste management (including retrieval, treatment, conditioning, 
storage, transport and disposal activities) and of dccontamination and dismantling oE 
nuclear facilities (including spent nuclear fuel rckieval and storage, TRU waste 
management, decommissioning of spent rue1 storage basins, pIutoniumantaminatcd 
buildings and highly irradiating nuclear facilities). His management experience includes 
staffs of up to ninety engineers and scientists developing technical strategies, performing 
project definition, conccptuar and detailed design, and supporting nuclear facilities 
operations. 
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Dr. Ross T. Thomas 
BWXT Serviccs 
Dr. Ross has 35 years of professional experience in the dcsign, operation, and safcty 
analysis of research, commercial, and defenserelated nuclear facilities. Xn the area of 
nuclear sarety, Dr. Ross served as Qe Radiation Safety Officer for two NRC licenses at 
VMI. Activities inciudcd A L A M  reviews, radiation s w e y s ,  leak tests, calibrations, and 
annual reviews. He was also an executive member ofthe Safety Review Committee for 
operations at BWXT, which covered activities such as hot cell operations, radioactive 
materials analysis, radiochemistry analyscs, and the handling ofhigh bum-up spent fuel. 
While at NUS, Dr. Ross managed a QA dcppartment and audited hundreds of  safety- 
rclated procedures and programs, He also has served as a startup and test engineer for 
two major nuclear facilities. 
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Dr. Wlliam IL Wilmarth 
Savannah River National Laboratory 
Dr. Wilmarlh is currently a Group Leader of the Advanced Characterization and Process 
rcsarch group of the Savannah National Laboratory. In this capacity, research into the 
treatment of high levd waste resulting from nuclear processing is conducted. Dr. 
Wilmarth has made significant contributions in the physiachemical understanding of high 
level wasto and has Ied in the development of several process flowsheets for the removal 
of strontium, d u m  and the actinides. Dr. Wilrnarth has served as technical lead for the 
deployment d i m  exchange materials for removal of cesium from waste5 stored at 
Savannah River and Hanfod Other endcavors included the examination of caustic side 
solvent extraction of cesium removal from Savannah River wastes. Additionally, Dr. 
Wilmmth and his co-workers developed a strontium and actinide rcmovd flowsheet for 
use in the Rivcr Protection Program, His rcscarch interests include actinide solvent 
cxtnclion and ion exchange supporting thc Fdanyon and FB-Line plutonium processing 
mission. Dr. WiImarh and others perfonncd rescarch into the pyrochernical processing 
of phtonium leading to a product acccptabla for purification at Sayamah River. Dr. 
Wilmarth has abo servcd as the SRNL Regulatory manager (1991 - 1997). In this 
capacity, Dr. Wilmarth managed the implementation and oversight programs for safety 
analysis, chemical hygiene, environrnentaf compliance, radiation protection and waste 
certification activities. 
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Dr. Ray Wymer 
Consultant 
Dr. W p e r  has consuIted extensively since his retirement in 1991 in the areas of 
radioactive waste management and site remediation for DOE and its contractors, He has 
had extensivc consulting cxpcrience at Hanford with the Tank Waste Remediation 
Systems program. He assists DOE and its conkactors in pmgram reviews. He has served 
on committees evaluating the storage of DOE fuels in the proposcd Yucca Mountain 
High-Level Waste Repository and chaired a committee evaluating potential vitrification 
proccsscs for Hanford tank wastes. 
Dr. Wymer has served on numerous committees and workshops of the National Academy 
of Sciences that dcal with DOE’S waste management and site remediation activities and 
closure activities, and chaired one of the committees. He has chaired reviews of thc 
Chcrnical Technology Division of Argonne NsltionaI Laboratory and the Nuclcar Science 
and Tcchnology Division Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
Dr. Wymer’s oher activities include consulting with DOE, h e  U.S. Dqp;utmcnt of Statc 
and the Intcmational Atomic Energy Agency on matters of nuclear non-proliferation in 
the arcas of nudear fuel reprocessing and umium cnrjchmcnt by chemical exchange 
proccsscs. 
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Dr. Frederick A. Zenz 
Consultant 
Dr, Zenz has w c t  60 years of chemical engineering and consuhing expcrience. His 
expertise revolves around fundamental studies in fluidization, entrainment, cyclone 
design, dipleg sizing, flared hole trays, and light hydrocarbon separation equipment. Dr. 
Z m  workcd with the Army Cop of Engineers as a Special Engineer working on 
analysis of diffusion cascade, power fqucncies, in-lehge, and computational design 
and properties Of w6. Dr. Zenz alsa worked in as a process engineer in air fractionation 
plant design, absorption, distillation, and correlation of physical properties of 
hydrocarbons and industrial chcmicals. 
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Concurrence Signatures 
The following individuals have pdcipatod in this review and ancur with the report's 
obscrvations and finding. 
Dr. Chris Burrows 
Senior Vice Presiden: Technology and En&ineering 
EnerW Solutions 
Dr. Robert Ilmcc Matthews 
Bruce Matihews, LLX: 
